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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a race with two groups of runners of equal ability. Indi-
viduals differ in their running ability, but the average speed of the
two groups is identical. Imagine that a handicapper gives each
individual in one of the groups a heavy weight to carry. Some of
those runners with weights would still run faster than some of
those without weights, but on average, the handicapped group
would fall farther and farther behind the group without the
handicap.
Now suppose that someone waves a magic wand and all of the
weights vanish. Equal opportunity has been created. If the two
groups are equal in their running ability, the gap between those
who never carried weights and those who used to carry weights
will cease to expand, but those who suffered the earlier discrimi-
nation will never catch up. If the economic baton can be handed
on from generation to generation, the current effects of past dis-
crimination can linger forever.'
Congress intended to solve the widespread problem of nonegal-
itarian hiring practices2 by enacting title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (the Act),3 during the apogee of the civil rights era. The Act
represented a national commitment to end discrimination and to
promote equality in employment.4 The enactment of title VII
spawned extensive commentary on the effect of facially neutral em-
ployment practices that perpetuated pre-Act discrimination.5 Par-
ticular controversy arose concerning the application of seniority
rules to blacks in jobs or seniority units from which they previously
1. L. THUROW, THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETr 188 (1980).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982) proscribes discrimination in employment based on race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. See Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. &
COM. L. REv. 431, 432 (1966) (reviewing circumstances that pressured Congress to enact title
VII).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-15 (1970), as amended by The Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2000e-17 (1982)). The effective date of title VII was July 2, 1965.
4. See Rachlin, Title VII: Limitations and Qualifications, 7 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REv. 473.
473 (1966) (stating clear purpose of title VII was equal employment opportunity for all
Americans).
5. See generally Bartholet, Application of Title IM7 to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. Rvv. 945
(1982);Jones, Some Reflections on Title I'll and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 at Twenty, 36 MERcR L
REv. 813 (1985); Luthans, The Impact of the Civil Rights Act on Employment Policies and Programs, 19
Lab. LJ. 323 (1968); Rachlin, supra note 4; Comment, The Distorted Adver'arial Posture of Title
VII Affirmative Action Challenges, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1543 (1980); Developments in the Lau-Employ.
ment Discrimination and Title 171 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 84 HARv. L. REV. 1109 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Developments-Title 1III.
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had been excluded because of their race.6
The problem of accommodating seniority systems and title VII
arose in times of economic distress, when employers had to decide
who would lose the job: the white employee who was more senior,
or the minority7 employee whose lack of seniority was the result of
historic discriminatory practices.8 The Supreme Court recently
gave this controversy new life in its decision in Firefighters Local 1784
v. Stotts.9
This Article will discuss the interplay between seniority systems
and title VII. Part I will examine the conflict that arises from the
6. For recent commentary, see generally Blumrosen, Seniority and Equal Employment Op-
portunity: A Glimmer of Hope, 23 RUTGERS L. REV. 268 (1969); Burke & Chase, Resolving the
Seniority/Minority Layoffs Conflict: An Employer-Targeted Approach, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 81
(1978); Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to
Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598 (1969);Jones, Title VII, Seniority,
and the Supreme Court: Clarification or Retreat?, 26 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (1977); Marinelli, Seniority
Systems and Title VII, 14 AKRON L. REV. 253 (1980); Comment, Employment Discrimination -
Seniority Systems Under Title VII, 62 N.C.L. REV. 357 (1984); Note, The Seniority System Exemption to
Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts: The Impact of a New Barrier to Title VII Litigants, 32 Clv. ST. L.
REV. 607 (1983-84) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Seniority System Exemption]; Note, Title VII,
Seniority Discrimination and the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARV. LJ. 1260 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Incumbent Negro]; Note, Title VII v. Seniority: Ensuring Rights or Denying Rights?, 26 How.
LJ. 1485 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Title VII]; Note, Civil Rights - Seniority Systems, 14
ST. MARY'S LJ. 95 (1982).
The illegality of the racially discriminatory impact of seniority systems predated the enact-
ment of title VII. Prior to the enactment of title VII, courts deemed discrimination in senior-
ity systems illegal under the duty of fair representation. See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville
R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 207 (1944) (enjoining enforcement of discriminatory collective bar-
gaining agreement under duty of fair representation); Tunstall v. Brotherhood, 323 U.S. 210,
213 (1944) (duty of fair representation); see also Blumrosen, supra at 276, 285 n.40 (some
holdings used duty of representation or violation of government contractual obligations to
find pre-Act racial discrimination illegal).
7. The author uses the term "minority" to refer to the classes protected under title VII.
Much of the case law deals with racial discrimination against blacks. The analysis, however,
should be equally applicable to other minority groups, such as native Americans, hispanics,
and women.
8. See Cooper & Sobol, supra note 6, at 1603 (discussing possible discriminatory effects
of seniority systems).
9. 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984). For recent commentary on Stotts, see generally Broderick,
Affirmative Action After Stotts: The Supreme Court's 1985 Term, 15 N.C. CENTRAL LJ. 145 (1985);
Fallon & Weiler, Firefighters v. Stotts: Conflicting Models of RacialJustice, 1984 Sup. CT. REV. 1;
Fox, Title VII Class Actions: Settling-Up Is Hard to Do, N.Y.U. THIRTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL NATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON LABOR 17-1 (1984); Spiegelman, Court-Ordered Hiring Quotas After Stotts: A Nar-
rative on the Role of the Moralities of the Web and the Ladder in Employment Discrimination Doctrine, 20
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339 (1985); Note, The False Alarm of Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v.
Stotts, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 991 (1985); Note, "Last Hired, First Fired"- Rights Without Remedies:
Firefighters v. Stotts, 1983 DET. C.L. REV. 215; Leading Cases of the 1983 Term, 98 HARV. L. REV.
267 (1984). After this article went to the printer, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 54 U.S.L.W. 4479 (1986), a case in which the Court ad-
dressed the constitutional aspects of affirmative action relief in a layoff context. See infra note
298 (framing the issue before the Supreme Court). The complexity of the opinion and the
timing of its issuance vis a vis this article makes it impossible to analyze the case in detail in
this article. See Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 54 U.S.L.W. 4479, 4492 n.7 (1986) (Mar-
shall, J. concurring) (commenting on the intricate nature of the Court's decision); see also infra
note 298 and accompanying text (evaluating initial impressions on the Wygant decision).
1986]
342 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:339
exemption of seniority systems from title VII.' 0 Part II will explore
judicial decisions that have addressed the seniority-title VII conflict.
Part III will analyze and critique the recent decision of the Supreme
Court in Stotts. Finally, Part IV will examine the continuing contro-
versy between title VII and seniority systems and conclude that,
since 1977, the Supreme Court has narrowed the relief available to
claimants under title VII in a manner contrary to the purposes of the
Act.
I. THE CONFLICT: SENIORITY AND TITLE VII
A. Seniority Systems
Employees earn seniority status based on length of service." In-
dividuals with greater seniority gain preferential treatment with re-
spect to certain employment decisions.12 Seniority is important
because it gives employees a measure of their expected job security
and plays a dominant role in making promotion decisions.13
Although for purposes of this Article it is unnecessary to explore
the myriad of existing seniority systems, it is important to recognize
that all seniority systems invariably affect the economic security of
an employee.14 In times of economic downturn, employees lose
their jobs on a last-hired, first-fired basis.15 An employee's security
in employment is directly proportional to seniority accrued. Theo-
retically, seniority systems affect all employees in the same way re-
gardless of race, gender, religion, or other similar criteria.' 6 In
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982). Section 703(h) of title VII exempts bona fide senior-
ity systems. Id. § 703(h). This seniority exemption provision reads as follows:
it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different
standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system ... provided that such differ-
ences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin ...
Id.
11. Cooper & Sobol, supra note 6, at 1602. Employers measure seniority in several ways;
by total term of employment, term of service in a department, term of service within a line of
progression, or term of service in a particular job. Id.
12. Id.
13. Blumrosen, supra note 6, at 270. Commentators agree in their recognition of senior-
ity's importance. See Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority Rights, 75
HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1534 (1962) (discussing role of seniority in labor movement);Jones, supra
note 6, at 3 n.24 (noting union members deem seniority a "fundamental right").
14. Blumrosen, supra note 6, at 270.
15. For a discussion of the last-hired, first-fired system, see generally Sheeran, Title III
and Layoffs Under the "Last-Hired, First-Fired" Seniority Rule, 26 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 409 (1976).
16. Sheeran, supra note 15, at 413 n.24. The last-hired, first-fired seniority provision is a
facially neutral, objective standard. Developments-Title VII, supra note 5, at 1111. However,
facially neutral standards such as intelligence tests, educational requirements, and arrest
records, can create some of the most persistent barriers to minorities in attaining equal op-
portunity. See id. at 1120 (alleging that neutral job qualifications effectively eliminate blacks
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reality, however, such systems have a deleterious effect on the em-
ployment opportunities and expectations of minority groups. 17
Seniority systems exist in most collective bargaining agreements
and result from negotiations between unions and employers.' 8
Althoigh collective bargaining agreements represent a progressive
move away from employers' unilateral control of the workplace, ra-
cially discriminatory' 9 practices exist as easily in collectively bar-
gained employment situations as in the totally employer-controlled
environment.20 Collectively bargained seniority systems merely re-
flect and perpetuate discriminatory employer hiring decisions. 2' In-
deed, unions often actively discriminated in the workplace, 22 which
led to conflicts between civil rights and labor movements.23
Challenges to the legality of racially discriminatory seniority sys-
tems predated the Civil Rights Act by over twenty years.24 In 1944,
the Supreme Court held that racially discriminatory provisions in a
collectively bargained agreement violated a union's duty of fair rep-
resentation. 25 Notwithstanding this declaration of illegality, racist
practices prevailed in the workplace through the early 1960's.26
from jobs). In such cases, courts experience difficulty in balancing the state's interest in im-
proving the economic status of minorities, the interest in productivity, and the interest in
fairness to majority workers. Id. at 1111 (questioning how courts strike balance of state's
interest with interest in fairness).
17. Cooper & Sobol, supra note 6, at 1603. While an advantage of seniority is objectivity,
the application of seniority rules to units that were formerly restricted to whites seriously
undercuts the job security of newly admitted blacks. Id.
18. Judicial interpretation recognizes the value of seniority provisions in collective bar-
gaining agreements. See Trans World Airlines Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 79 (1977) (stat-
ing seniority provisions universally included in bargaining contracts); Humphrey v. Moore,
375 U.S. 335, 346 (1964) (holding seniority provisions of overriding importance in collective
bargaining).
19. Discriminatory seniority systems will affect other protected classes as well, such as
women. This is the assumption throughout this Article where instances of racial discrimina-
tion are discussed.
20. Blumrosen, supra note 6, at 271.
21. See id. at 271-73 (noting union role in workplace discrimination).
22. Id. at 273. Professor Blumrosen points out that employers used seniority rules to
exclude minorities from the more respectable 'white jobs,' and relegate them to the less desir-
able, lower payingjobs. Minorities have not received the benefits from the institutional pro-
tection of trade unionism. Id.
23. Id. The civil rights movement viewed seniority not as a protection against arbitrary
managerial action, but as an instrument of oppression, perpetuating the subordinate status of
blacks. Id.
24. Prior to enactment of the Civil Rights Act, plaintiffs challenged the legality of racially
discriminatory seniority systems under the Railway Labor Act. See Steele v. Louisville & Nash-
ville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 199 (1944) (holding bargaining representative acting under au-
thority of Railway Labor Act had duty of fair representation); Tunstal v. Brotherhood of
Locomative Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210, 211 (1944) (following holding of Steele).
25. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944); see also Blum-
rosen, supra note 6, at 273 (indicating that trade unions did not fairly represent blacks);Jones,
supra note 6, at I (noting that prior to title VII the seniority issue was analyzed under the fair
representation doctrine).
26. Blumrosen, supra note 6, at 276. The situation remained substantially as it had been
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Elimination of overt discrimination against minority workers in
the employment environment required that active steps be taken to
achieve an egalitarian work force.2 7 Ending discrimination alone
would do little to establish equality. 28 Something also had to be
done about perpetuation of the effects of discriminatory seniority
systems. The enactment of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
at least initially, provided a glimmer of hope that the discriminatory
effects of seniority systems would be eradicated. 29
B. Title VII
The Civil Rights Act of 196430 is considered the most important
civil rights legislation of the century, and title VII, the antidis-
crimination in employment section, its most important section.3'
Title VII prohibits private employers, employment agencies, and
unions from discriminating in hiring, firing, compensation, and
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.3 2 The Act invalidates those
practices that constitute different treatment based on one of the
proscribed classifications,33 as well as those practices which,
although facially neutral, adversely affect the protected classes.3 4
The proscription of such practices achieves the dual goals of elimi-
nating pervasive social inequalities and promoting equal employ-
ment opportunities.
The Act, consistent with the broad purposes of title VII, provides
courts with broad powers to fashion adequate remedies for discrimi-
nation. It specifically authorizes courts to award injunctive relief,
monetary relief, affirmative action relief,3 5 and attorney's fees.3 6
during the time of overt racist practices. Minorities began to receive some of the lower pay-
ing, less secure "white" jobs as they became available. Employers and unions, however, re-
fused to give employees seniority credit for time spent in Negro jobs. Id. at 277.
27. L. THUROW, supra note 1, at 189 (stating that elimination of current effects of past
discrimination requires special privileges for those previously handicapped).
28. See id. (discussing current effects of past discrimination).
29. See supra note 5 and articles cited therein (recent commentary on title VII).
30. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
31. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DIsCRIMINATION LAw, vii (2d ed. 1983).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982). The Act was later amended to include public employ-
ers. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 11, 86 Stat. 103,
111 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1982)).
33. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15
(1977) (finding title VII violation where employer refused to recruit, hire, transfer, or pro-
mote minorities on an equal basis with whites).
34. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,430 (1971) (stating that title VII prohib-
its facially neutral practices which operate to "freeze" status quo of prior discriminatory em-
ployment practices).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982).
344
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Additionally, the Act permits courts to fashion any other equitable
relief that the court deems appropriate. 37
The provisions of the Act, ostensibly clear on their face, have pro-
duced widespread confusion. 38 Section 703(h), the seniority sys-
tems exemption, 39 in particular, has been the subject of much
litigation as well as scholarly comment and speculation. 40 This sec-
tion permits employers to use different standards of compensation
and terms and conditions of employment pursuant to a bona fide
seniority system.4' As the only provision in the Act that deals with
seniority, it is the source of the conflict between seniority rights and
the Act's purpose of achieving equality in employment.
The seniority systems exemption was part of the Mansfield-Dirk-
sen amendment. 42 The drafters crafted the exemption in response
to expressions of fear that the Act, in its original form, might com-
promise seniority rights.43 Specifically, proponents of the amend-
ment feared that the Act would curtail the collective bargaining
power of labor organizations and give preferential treatment in em-
ployment to newly hired blacks over more senior whites.44 These
concerns were the basis of substantial congressional debate.45
Three memoranda exist from the Senate's consideration of title VII
that addressed the issue of the Act's impact on seniority. 46
First, the United States Department ofJustice submitted a memo-
randum to Congress rebutting arguments that title VII would, inter
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
38. See generally Vaas, supra note 2, at 444 (noting Congress' attempt to create detailed
legislative history on title VII to guide courts).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 200e-2(h) (1982). For text of § 703(h), see supra note 10.
40. See supra note 6 (citing articles concerning seniority systems exemption).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982). The statute does not define a bona fide seniority
system and a precise definition has never been supplied by the courts. See supra note 10 for
text of § 703(h). In International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977),
the Supreme Court stated that a bona fide seniority system is one that applies equally to all
races and ethnic groups, is rational and consistent with industry practice and National Labor
Relations Board precedent, does not have its genesis in racial discrimination, and was negoti-
ated and has been maintained free from any illegal purpose. Id. at 355-56.
42. 110 CONG. REC. 11,935-36.
43. See Cooper & Sobol, supra note 6, at 1608-10 (discussing debate over effect of origi-
nal bill on seniority rights).
44. See id. at 1613 (discussing criticism of original bill on seniority issue by Senator Hill).
45. See id. at 1608-14 (discussing congressional debate on seniority systems exemption);
see also International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 352 (1977) (reading
legislative history as authoritative indicator of purpose of § 703(h)). But see American To-
bacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982) (disregarding legislative history information in
favor of plain language of § 703(h)).
46. The memoranda included an interpretive memorandum the Department of Justice
prepared at Senator Clark's request, 110 CONG. REC. 7207 (1964); an interpretive memoran-
dum that Senators Clark and Case prepared, id. at 7212-15; and responses to questions that
Senator Dirksen posed to Senator Clark. Id. at 7216-17.
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alia, undermine existing seniority rights.47 This memorandum,
however, failed to resolve the conflict between existing discrimina-
tory seniority systems and the Act's purpose of promoting equal em-
ployment opportunities. It asserted that the Act would have no
impact on seniority rights that existed at the time the Act took ef-
fect,48 but that the Act would invalidate a seniority rule that was
itself discriminatory.49
A second memorandum submitted by Senators Clark and Case5 °
provided conflicting information about the effect of title VII on sen-
iority rights. Although the memorandum maintained that the Act
would not have an impact on seniority rights,5' it conceded that the
Act would render illegal the use of seniority lists that employers
maintained on a discriminatory basis prior to the Act.52
A final memorandum that Senator Clark incorporated into the
record during floor debate stated, in substance, that the Act would
not change employees' seniority status.53 Indeed, in a last-hired,
first-fired system, the memorandum stated, an employer could fire a
minority worker because of lack of seniority, but not because of his
race.54 Such qualifications, however, create confusion regarding the
effect of section 703(h) on seniority systems.
The late Senator Hubert Humphrey, who was a strong advocate
of the Act, voiced his support for the seniority provision and noted
that the section "merely clarified" the intent of the Act and did not
interfere with its purpose.5 5 He added that this provision "makes
47. 110 CONG. REC. 7207 (1964). The memorandum explained that title VII would have
no effect on existing seniority rights:
• ..in the ordinary case, assuming that seniority rights were built up over a period
of time during which Negroes were not hired, these rights would not be set aside by
the taking effect of title VII. Employers and labor organizations would simply be
under a duty not to discriminate against Negroes because of their race. Any differ-
ences in treatment based on established seniority rights would not be based on race
and would not be forbidden by the title.
Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. For example, if a seniority rule required laying off minorities before white work-
ers, title VII would invalidate the rule. Id.
50. Id. at 7212-13.
51. Id. at 7213. Senators Clark and Case argued that title VII was prospective in nature:
• . . if a business has been discriminating in the past and as a result has an all-white
working force, when the title comes into effect the employer's obligation would be
simply to fill future vacancies on a nondiscriminatory basis. He would not be
obliged-or indeed, permitted-to fire whites in order to hire Negroes, or to prefer
Negroes for future vacancies, or, once Negroes are hired, to give them special senior-
ity rights at the expense of the white workers hired earlier.
Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 7216-17.
54. Id. at 7217.
55. Id. at 12,723.
346
TITLE VII V. SENIORITY
clear" that title VII only prohibits discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.56 These statements provide
no better guidance as to the section's true impact than any of the
congressional memoranda.
Thus, the congressional memoranda and comments are not dis-
positive on the meaning of section 703(h). On first impression this
legislative history appears to support a blanket protection of bona
fide seniority systems. However, in the context of the Act, the pur-
pose of which was to eradicate racial discrimination, section 703(h)'s
perpetuation of a system that had its genesis in the midst of rampant
racially discriminatory practices appears contradictory.5 7
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF TITLE VII AND SENIORITY
Until 1977, courts interpreted title VII broadly, extending its
reach to seniority systems that perpetuated the effects of past dis-
crimination and construing the relief provisions so as to "make
whole" the individuals and groups who experienced discrimina-
tion. 58 In 1977, however, the Supreme Court dramatically changed
directions with its decision in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States. 59 In Teamsters, the Court read expansively the seniority
systems exemption, thus increasing the protection of seniority sys-
tems against title VII challenges and thereby limiting available re-
lief. 60 After Teamsters, the Court continued to read the Act in a
restrictive manner and to impose limitations on available reme-
dies. 6' In 1984, the Supreme Court's decision in Stotts6 2 furthered
this trend and arguably emasculated title VII's allowance of affirma-
56. Id.
57. For a detailed analysis of the interpretive problems of § 703(h), see Cooper & Sobol,
supra note 6, at 1611-14. Cooper and Sobol point out that conclusions that many will draw
from the language of title VII and its legislative history will undoubtedly reflect their ap-
proach to the abstract question of whether the application of seniority rules to newly hired
minority workers in a formerly white-only seniority unit constitutes discrimination on grounds
of race. Senator Clark's statements, for instance, would support those who insist that a neu-
trally applied seniority system is nondiscriminatory regardless of its context. Id. The legisla-
tive history and the language and structure of title VII, however, also support the conclusion
that Clark's statements did not correctly reflect Congress' purposes with respect to the senior-
ity issue. Id. at 1611.
58. See generally infra notes 64-99 and accompanying text (discussing pre-Teamsters
decisions).
59. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
60. See id. at 352-53 (holding that Congress intended § 703(h) to protect bona fide sen-
iority systems even if employer's pre-Act discrimination worked to benefit of majority).
61. See, e.g., United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977) (focusing on exist-
ence of present violation); East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395,
404 (1977) (past discriminatory practices not injurious to plaintiffs); see also Jones, supra note
6, at 37-44 (discussing Teamsters and its progeny).
62. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
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tive action relief.63
A. The Pre-Teamsters Era
In 1968, in Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc.,64 a federal district court
concluded that the reach of the Act included present effects of past
discrimination in seniority systems.65 The court reasoned that Con-
gress did not intend to "freeze an entire generation" of minority
employees into discriminatory patterns that existed before the
Act. 66 The court found that the language of title VII did not sup-
port a restrictive reading of the Act's reach. 67 Fundamental to the
court's opinion in Quarles was its finding that a system having its
genesis in racial discrimination was not bona fide.68
A year after Quarles, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in Local 189 Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States69
furthered the goal of promoting equality in employment. The court
in Papermakers agreed with the decision in Quares that section 703(h)
protection of seniority systems did not extend to facially neutral sys-
tems that perpetuated the effects of past discrimination. 70 The
court, however, balanced nonminorities' interests in theirjob expec-
tations against minorities' interests in equal employment opportuni-
ties. 71 In balancing these interests, the court concluded that
Congress did not intend to give preferential treatment to victims of
discrimination by displacing incumbent employees. 72 The court
thus limited future courts' authority to grant "fictional seniority" as
63. See infra notes 272-78 and accompanying text (discussing effect of Stotts on title VII
plaintiffs).
64. 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
65. Id. at 510.
66. Id. at 516. The relief that the court provided in Quarles allowed blacks, who had been
hired prior to a certain date and slotted into undesirable jobs, to transfer and fill vacancies in
more desirable departments transferring with them their total accumulated seniority. Id. at
520-2 1; see also Note, Incumbent Negro, supra note 6, cited in Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F.
Supp. 505, 511 (E.D. Va. 1968) (courts must adjust seniority systems so past discrimination
does not continue harming black employees).
67. Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 515 (E.D. Va. 1968). The court
stated that the plain language of the Act prohibits all racial discrimination affecting employ-
ment without excluding the present discriminatory effects of pre-Act discrimination. Id.
68. Id. at 517.
69. 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970). Papemnakers involved
an employer who maintained a racially segregated work force until 1964. Id. at 983-84. In
1966, the employer integrated the progression lines on the basis of pay, which resulted in
blacks with more total seniority, in terms of years of service, having less seniority than some
whites with fewer years of service. Id.
70. Id. at 982-83. The court held that the employer's job seniority system "was unlawful
because by carrying forward the effects of former discriminatory practices the system resulted
in present and future discrimination." Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 995.
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relief in title VII actions.73
Papermakers, thus, represented a middle course. In adopting the
"rightful place" interpretation, the court prohibited employers from
filling future vacancies on the basis of seniority systems that locked
in prior racial classifications, and allowed a black to be assigned to a
position only once a vacancy occurred.74 The court, however, re-
jected the "freedom now" interpretation, which would permit the
"bumping" of white workers from their presently held jobs.75 The
court also rejected the "status quo" approach which would require
only the termination of discrimination without requiring corrective
action with respect to prior discrimination.76 The court held that its
approach served the purpose of the Act and was true to its legisla-
tive history.77 Yet such an approach forced victims of discrimination
to remain in their inferior positions until vacancies occurred.
Despite the court's moderate retreat in Papernakers, title VII was
in its heyday. In 1971 the Supreme Court decided Griggs v. Duke
Power Company,78 a landmark case liberally interpreting and ex-
panding title VII's coverage in an effort to follow the revolutionary
spirit of the Act.79 Indeed, one commentator called Griggs "the
most important decision in employment discrimination law." 80 In
its decision in Griggs, the Court applied the "disparate impact" the-
ory of discrimination, which invalidated facially neutral practices
that had a disproportionate and deleterious effect on the protected
73. Id.
74. Id. at 988. By fashioning relief in this manner the court protected the interests of
whites by not letting minorities displace them. This "rightful place" theory of relief
originated from a student Note. See id. at 988 n. 11 (citing Note, Incumbent Negro, supra note 6,
at 1268). With this theory the court charted a course between the more liberal "freedom
now" theory which entailed the displacement of white incumbents by minority workers and
the "status quo" theory which merely required termination of discrimination. See id. at 988
(describing various forms of relief court considered).
75. Id. Other courts followed the Papermakers approach adopting the "rightful place"
and rejecting the "freedom now" doctrine; see, e.g., Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535
F.2d 257, 267-68 (4th Cir.) (reversing district court's acceptance of"freedom now" doctrine),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976); EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 316 (6th Cir.
1975) (adopting "rightful place" doctrine); United States v. N.L. Indus. Inc., 479 F.2d 354,
374-75 (6th Cir. 1973) (adopting "rightful place" doctrine); United States v. Chesapeake &
Ohio Rys., 471 F.2d 582, 593 (4th Cir. 1972) (holding victim of discrimination need not for-
feit seniority when transferred to position denied him because of discrimination).
76. Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 988
(5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
77. Id.
78. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Although this case did not concern seniority rights, it is impor-
tant because it expanded the reach of the Act in a way critical to the evaluation of the senior-
ity-title VII conflict.
79. See Bartholet, supra note 5, at 951-52 (discussing broad effect of Court's decision in
Griggs on antidiscrimination principle).
80. B. SCHLE1 & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 31, at 5.
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:339
classes. 8' The Court recognized that employers may violate the
spirit of the Act even when they employ practices that, on their face,
do not evince any differential treatment of minorities.8 2
The Court's mandate in Griggs was overwhelmingly simple. It
stated that the objective of Congress in the enactment of title VII
was to achieve equal employment opportunities and remove dis-
criminatory barriers.8 3 Under the Act, the Court held employers
cannot maintain facially neutral practices, procedures, or tests if
they "operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory em-
ployment practices." 8 4 This holding significantly extended the
reach of title VII.85 After the Court's decision in Griggs, an em-
ployer's promulgation of facially neutral policies and lack of bad
faith could not overcome a showing that its policies disfavored a
protected group.8 6
In Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.,87 the Court held that the
Act allowed the award of class-based seniority relief to identifiable
victims of illegal hiring discrimination.88 The Court in Franks, as in
Papermakers, balanced the interests of minority and nonminority em-
ployees.8 9 In doing so, it recognized that awarding retroactive sen-
iority to victims of discrimination could have a negative effect on the
status of incumbent employees. The Court concluded, however,
that failure to award such relief would frustrate the remedial objec-
tives of the Act.90 The Court noted that Congress, in furtherance of
a strong public policy interest,9 1 may modify employee expectations
arising from a seniority system agreement, and held that nothing
either in the language of the Act or in its legislative history evinced
any intent on the part of Congress to prohibit the award of retroac-
tive seniority to victims of discrimination. 92 This remedy permitted
81. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
82. Id. at 431.
83. Id. at 429-30.
84. Id. at 430.
85. See Bartholet, supra note 5, at 951 (stating that Court in Griggs radically expanded
antidiscrimination principle).
86. In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), for example, the Supreme
Court upheld the propriety of back-pay relief to minority plaintiffs who were "locked into"
lower paying job classifications by an employer's seniority system and program of employ-
ment testing. Id. at 418-22. The Court held that an employer's absence of bad faith was
insufficient reason for denying back pay and concluded that to condition the availability of
such relief of an employer's motivation was inconsistent with the Act and its legislative his-
tory. Id. at 422-23.
87. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
88. Id. at 779.
89. Id. at 774-75.
90. Id. at 775.
91. Id. at 778.
92. Id. at 774-75.
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victims of discrimination to obtain their deserved status in the hier-
archy of seniority.93
After the Court's decision in Franks, employers could no longer
invoke section 703(h) to protect a seniority system once an illegal
employment practice had occurred. 94 The Court's decision estab-
lished that courts could no longer deny retroactive seniority to vic-
tims of discrimination on the basis of a possible adverse impact on
other employees, 95 as long as the relief granted furthered the objec-
tives of title VII. 96
Justices Powell and Rehnquist wrote separate opinions in Franks
objecting to an award of relief that would have an adverse impact on
"perfectly innocent employees." 97 Both Justices insisted that the
rights of such employees should be weighed heavily in a balancing
of their rights against the rights of victims of discrimination.9"
These objections became increasingly important as the decade
progressed. Indeed, the objections became the majority view as the
tide shifted in 1977 with the Supreme Court's decision in Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States.99
B. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States:
The Turning Point
In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,'00 the
Supreme Court began to expand the scope of section 703(h)'s pro-
tection of seniority systems and to focus on the protection of senior-
ity rights of nonminority employees. In the Teamsters decision, the
Court declared lawful, under title VII, a seniority system that per-
petuated the effects of pre-Act discrimination. 10 The majority rea-
soned that, although under Griggs a facially neutral employment
practice with a disparate impact on a protected class was illegal
under title VII, section 703(h) provided an exemption for bona fide
seniority systems.10 2 The Court agreed that the employer had en-
93. Id. at 768.
94. Id. at 757.
95. Id. (quoting United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 663 (2d Cir.
1971)) (declining to deny relief based on effect on majority employees).
96. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 31, at 79 (noting that Supreme Court in
Franks clearly indicated that title VII's legislative policy of making whole victims of discrimina-
"tion overrides the interests of majority employees).
97. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 781, 789 (1976) (dissenting opinions
of Powell, J. and Rehnquist, J).
98. Id. at 790.
99. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 353-54.
102. Id.
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gaged in a pattern and practice of employment discrimination
against minorities;103 the evidence showed pervasive statistical dis-
parities in employment of minorities and whites as well as specific
instances of discrimination.10 4 The Court concluded that, in the ab-
sence of the section 703(h) exemption, the Court's decision in Griggs
would have invalidated the seniority system in Teamsters.'0 5 In enact-
ing section 703(h), however, the Court explained that Congress
granted a measure of immunity to seniority systems, even where
such systems perpetuate the effects of prior discrimination. 106
Thus, the Court in Teamsters overruled a decade of legal precedent
under Quarles, Papermakers, and their progeny. 107 The Court con-
cluded that it was not the intent of Congress to render illegal
nonminority employees' exercise of vested seniority rights, even if
this exercise had an impact on the rights of victims of discrimina-
tion.108 The Court dismissed the Government's contention that to
uphold as bona fide a system that perpetuated pre-Act discrimina-
tion would "disembowel" section 703(h).10 9 As a result of the
Court's decision in Teamsters, a title VII claimant must establish ac-
tual intent to discriminate as a prerequisite to a finding that a sen-
iority system violates the Act.' 10
Although the Court did not disturb the holding in Franks that ret-
roactive seniority is a viable form of relief in title VII actions, I"' its
holding in Teamsters that a seniority system with a discriminatory ef-
fect was lawful under section 703(h) severely limited the retroactive
seniority relief available to victims of unlawful hiring practices. It
precluded an award of retroactive seniority to persons laid off pur-
suant to the routine operation of a bona fide seniority system, even
if such layoffs perpetuated past discrimination." 12
Chronologically, Teamsters demarcates the Supreme Court's shift
103. Id. at 337-43.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 349.
106. Id. at 350-51.
107. See id. at 378-80 (Marshall,J., dissenting) (noting that Court overturned over 30 cases
from six courts of appeals concerning scope of title VII).
108. Id. at 352-54. The Court stated that Congress did not intend to disallow "the use of
existing seniority lists and thereby destroy or water down the vested seniority rights of em-
ployees simply because their employer had engaged in discrimination prior to the passage of
the Act." Id. at 353.
109. Id. at 353.
110. Id. at 335 & n.15. The Court made clear that it was operating under a disparate
treatment theory as opposed to a disparate impact theory. Id. Disparate treatment requires
proof of intent whereas disparate impact involves facially neutral employment practices that
fall more harshly on one group than another. Id. at 335 n.15.
111. Id. at 347.
112. See id. at 378 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Act invalidated all practices
that perpetuated effects of past discrimination).
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in perspective. In the preceding decade, starting with Quarles and
culminating with Franks, the Court focused on the rights of minori-
ties to achieve the congressional mandate for equal employment op-
portunities.113 The goal was equality, so that minorities could attain
their "rightful place" when a vacancy became available. 114
Although courts considered the rights of white incumbents and
would not bump them to give preferential treatment to minorities,
courts recognized that incumbents' interests might have to "bend"
in the effort to make minority group members whole." 15
The Court in Teamsters, however, made it more arduous to obtain
equal employment opportunities. The legalization of systems that
perpetuated the effects of past discrimination created an unpalat-
able situation, permanently handicapping victims of discrimination.
The cases that followed Teamsters continued to impose this result, as
the Court moved steadily towards striking a balance in favor of col-
lective bargaining at the expense of tide VII's equal employment
opportunity goals.
C. The Post-Teamsters Era
In United Air Lines Inc. v. Evans,116 the Court extended the scope of
section 703(h)'s protection of seniority systems. The Court reiter-
ated that section 703(h) and labor policy precluded invalidation of a
facially neutral seniority system, regardless of its discriminatory ef-
fects."17 In its decision in Evans, the Court held that post-Act dis-
crimination, which was not made the subject of a timely charge, was
"the legal equivalent of a discriminatory act which occurred before
the statute was passed.""18 The Court's language in Evans changed
dramatically from its language in Franks, thereby greatly expanding
the protection afforded seniority systems under section 703(h)." l9
113. See supra notes 64-68 and 87-99 and accompanying text (discussing Quarles and
Franks).
114. See supra notes 74-75 (discussing courts' acceptance of "rightful place" doctrine).
115. Id.
116. 431 U.S. 553 (1977). In Evans, the claimant was a woman who had been forced to
resign from her job at the time of her marriage. Id. at 554. In 1972, after a finding that the
no-marriage rule violated title VII, her employer rehired her. Id. at 555. However, she re-
ceived no seniority credit for the time that she had served with the employer prior to the
wrongfully forced resignation. The Supreme Court held that she was treated the same as
males who were hired after her resignation and prior to her rehire. Id. at 557-58. The Court
also ruled that although the seniority system perpetuated the effects of past discrimination,
the plaintiff failed to allege that the seniority system was discriminatory. Id.
117. Id. at 560.
118. Id. at 558.
119. Compare id. at 560 (stating that § 703(h) permits attacks on presently discriminatory
seniority systems) with Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398, 417 (5th Cir. 1974)
(stating that discrimination that occurs in past hiring procedures does not affect bona fides of
seniority system).
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In Transworld Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,120 the Court once again
stressed the seniority rights of nonminorities. The Court refused to
deprive a nonminority employee of vested seniority rights under a
collective bargaining agreement at the expense of a title VII claim-
ant.12 1 The Court based its deference to contractual rights of ma-
jority employees on the national labor policy that favors collective
bargaining as a means of effecting workable and enforceable agree-
ments between management and labor. 122 This reasoning radically
shifted the Court's emphasis from its earlier focus on the public pol-
icy aims of tide VII to contractual rights of majority employees.
Two years later the Court decided that affirmative action pro-
grams are permissible under title VII, even if they conflict with the
seniority rights of nonminorities. In United Steelworkers v. Weber, 123
the Court held that title VII did not prohibit voluntary race-con-
scious affirmative action plans that were the product of collective
bargaining between an employer and a union.' 24 The plan in ques-
tion attempted to ameliorate the significant underrepresentation of
blacks that existed in the employer's work force, which was an "ar-
guable violation of Title VII.' ' 25 Two factors were important to the
Court in Weber. First, the affirmative action program was the prod-
uct of a collective bargaining agreement.' 26 Second, the program
was temporary and was designed to eliminate a possible violation of
the Act.' 27
Still, the Court in Weber paid great attention to the rights of
nonminorities.12 8 The majority found the plan acceptable because
it did not unnecessarily impinge on the interests of the white em-
ployees.' 29 The plan sufficiently protected the rights of the majority
group because it neither required the discharge and replacement of
120. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
121. Id. at 80-8 1. This case did not involve discrimination based on race. The Court held
that an employer should not be required to circumvent its seniority system to force a senior
employee to relieve a junior employee on religious holidays. Id. Thus, the case is relevant
because the majority group's contractual interests prevailed over the social goals of the legis-
lation. Id.
122. Id. at 79.
123. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
124. Id. at 197. The Court in Weber held, against the challenge of a white worker, that title
VII permitted a private sector voluntary affirmative action program aimed at equal employ-
ment opportunity. Id. At issue in Weber was a collective bargaining agreement that estab-
lished training programs for the purpose of teaching unskilled production workers the skills
of craft workers. The program reserved 50% of the openings for blacks. Id.
125. Id. at 211 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 197.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 208.
129. Id.
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whites by blacks,130 nor absolutely prevented whites from advanc-
ing.13 1 The plan was merely a temporary measure that did not at-
tempt to racially balance the work force; rather it was designed to
eliminate an existing racial imbalance.' 3 2 Notwithstanding the
Court majority's view that the plan sufficiently protected the rights
of white employees, Justices Burger and Rehnquist dissented be-
cause the plan allowed the employer to make employment decisions
on the basis of race.'3 3 They insisted that, because the Act man-
dated color blindness in all employment decisions, the agreement in
question discriminated on the basis of race in violation of sections
703(a) and (d).13 4
In Pullman-Standard v. Swint,' 3 5 the Supreme Court reiterated the
Teamsters standard, stating that section 703(h) protects a seniority
system unless the plaintiff proves an intent, to discriminate.13 6 The
Court in Swint stated that section 703(h) protects a seniority system
even if the system perpetuates the effects of pre-Act discrimina-
tion.13 7 Between the Teamsters and the Swint decisions, therefore,
the Supreme Court eviscerated its previous decisions that applied a
disparate impact analysis to seniority system challenges under title
VII. 138
The Court in American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson'39 extended section
130. Id.
131. Id. Half of the trainees admitted to the challerged program were white. Id.
132. Id. The Supreme Court in Weber fashioned a narrow holding that did not delineate
between permissible and impermissible affirative action plans. The Court merely held that
the particular plan at issue was permissible because, like the Act, it attempted to eradicate
racial segregation and because the scheme did not unnecessarily affect the rights of white
employees. Id. Consequently, the Court left unsettled the, question of whether title VII pro-
hibited seniority overrides pursuant to policies designed to protect a racial/gender balance
during layoffs.
133. Id. at 254. The dissenting justices argued that "in passing title VII, Congress out-
lawed all racial discrimination." Id. (emphasis added).
134. Id. at 253.
135. 456 U.S. 273 (1982).
136. Id. at 289. In a challenge by black employees to a seniority system, the district court
in Swint found that the application of the seniority system fell under § 703(h) protection be-
cause it did not result from an intention to discriminate. Id. at 275. Finding that the facts
demonstrated an intention to discriminate, the court of appeals reversed. Id. The Supreme
Court, finding error in the court of appeals' analysis, reversed thejudgment. Id. at 276. The
petitioners contended that pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 52, a district court's factual findings
could not be set aside unless they were "clearly erroneous." Id. at 277. The Supreme Court
agreed and noted that the court of appeals had made its own findings of fact. Id. at 283. The
Court concluded that the question of intent to discriminate was a question of fact to be de-
cided by the fact finder and the appellate court must accept the district court finding unless
clearly erroneous. Id. at 287.
137. Id. at 277. Indeed, the Court underscored its position by stating that discriminatory
intent meant actual motive and "not a legal presumption to be drawn from a factual showing
of something less than actual motive." Id. at 289-90.
138. See supra notes 64-98 and accompanying text (describing pre-Teamsters cases applying
disparate impact analysis).
139. 456 U.S. 63 (1982).
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703(h)'s protection of seniority systems beyond the holdings in
Teamsters and Evans.' 40 In Patterson, the Court ruled that section
703(h) protected bona fide seniority systems created after the pas-
sage of the Act. 14 1 The Court stated that Congress did not intend to
distinguish between seniority systems adopted before and after the
Act. 142
In Patterson, the Court rejected the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission's (the EEOC) position. The EEOC urged the
Court to construe the Teamsters and Evans decisions narrowly to pro-
tect only pre-Act bona fide seniority systems that were neither cre-
ated nor maintained with an intent to discriminate. 143 The majority
in Patterson found this position untenable because "the EEOC's
reading of section 703(h) would make it illegal to adopt, and in
practice to apply, seniority systems that fall within the class of sys-
tems protected by the provision."' 44 The majority in Patterson, how-
ever, upheld an award of retroactive seniority even though it
recognized that such an award might conflict with the statements in
the legislative history cited by the EEOC that title VII would not
affect seniority rights. The Court concluded, however, that Con-
gress intended title VII to have a minimal impact on seniority.145
Dissenting in Patterson, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun
urged that the majority's extension of section 703(h)'s scope of pro-
tection was inconsistent with the statute.' 46 They believed that Con-
gress did not intend to protect "new rights that are the by-product
of discrimination."' 47 The dissent concluded that such post-Act sys-
tems should be subject to the disparate impact analysis set forth in
Griggs.148 Justice Stevens, separately dissenting, agreed with this po-
sition and argued that "a seniority system that is unlawful at the
time it is adopted cannot be 'bona fide' within the meaning of sec-
tion 703(h)."'149
The Court reiterated in Patterson its rejection in Teamsters of the
140. Id. at 75-77. see supra notes 99-112 and accompanying text (discussing holding in
Teamsters in which Court protected seniority systems created prior to passage of title VII);
notes 116-19 and accompanying text (discussing holding in Evans in which court protected
post-Act practices that, due to untimely nature of charge, would be treated as if they occurred
prior to passage of Act).
141. American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 77 (1982).
142. Id. at 75-76 (citing to Teamsters, Evans, and legislative history as support for
conclusion).
143. Id. at 73-74.
144. Id. at 71.
145. Id. at 74 n.15.
146. Id. at 77 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 78.
148. Id. at 86.
149. Id. at 87 (footnotes omitted).
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Quarles ruling that the Act applied to present effects of pre-Act prac-
tices.150 The Court also extended Teamsters by holding that section
703(h) insulated a bona fide seniority system even if it was created
after the Act's passage.' 5' The Court's requirement in Patterson of
proof of intention to discriminate for the invalidation of a seniority
system undermined the Court's holding in Griggs that the Act ex-
tends to practices that are discriminatory in operation.' 52
Minority employees' prospects brightened momentarily in 1982.
In Zipes v. Transworld Airways, Inc., 53 the Court considered whether
to allow an award of retroactive seniority contrary to a collective
bargaining agreement when there was no finding that the union had
discriminated illegally.' 54 In an opinion authored by Justice White,
the Court upheld the propriety under title VII of an award of retro-
active seniority.' 55 In particular, the Court held that the finding that
the union had not discriminated did not interfere with an award of
retroactive seniority relief once the Court had found that the em-
ployer had discriminated.' 56 In addition, the Court concluded that
section 706(g) of the Act permitted class-based seniority relief be-
cause it furthered the Act's goals of making whole victims of
discrimination.1 57
In the same year, however, the Court dramatically cut back on a
discriminatee's rights to retroactive seniority. Although the Court
in Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC'58 did not address directly the judiciary's
power to award retroactive seniority relief, it stated that an em-
ployer charged with discrimination in hiring could toll the continu-
ing accrual of back pay liability under section 7 06(g) by
unconditionally offering the claimant the denied job even if the
claimant did not accept the offer.' 59 In an opinion which contains
150. Id.'at 76.
151. See id. (stating § 703(h) made no distinction between seniority systems adopted prior
to effective date of Act and those adopted after).
152. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). The Court in Griggs had held
that title VII proscribes overt discrimination as well as "practices that are fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation." Id; see also supra notes 68 and 70 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing findings in Quares and Papermaker that seniority system with origins in racial discrimi-
nation not bona fide).
153. 455 U.S. 385 (1982).
154. Id. at 387.
155. Id. at 400. The Court faced the issue of retroactive seniority in the context of female
flight attendants who had been grounded illegally after becoming mothers, while their male
counterparts, who had become fathers, had been permitted to continue to fly. Id. at 388. The
Court's holding gave hope to title VII advocates that the equal employment goals of the Act
were still alive. Id. at 400.
156. Id. at 400.
157. Id. at 399-400; see infra note 227 for the text of § 706(g).
158. 458 U.S. 219 (1982).
159. Id. at 229-30.
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by far the strongest language in support of the rights of nonminority
employees, the majority of the Court held that an offer of retroac-
tive seniority was not necessary to toll back pay liability.' 60 The
Court reasoned that tolling back pay liability, by merely offering an
alleged discriminatee the position originally sought, would en-
courage employers to hire title VII claimants and would thus serve
the make-whole objective of the Act.' 61 The Court concluded that
to require an offer of retroactive seniority would not encourage em-
ployers' voluntary compliance with the Act because it would render
the decision to hire a title VII claimant more costly than the decision
to hire another applicant.' 62 The majority felt that a job offer
served the make-whole objective of the Act without creating the la-
bor unrest and loss of productivity that would result from giving
claimants seniority over incumbents who earned their places
through work on the job. 16 3
Not unexpectedly, a strong dissent criticized the majority in Ford
for ignoring the equitable presumption of full restitution estab-
lished in Franks.16 4 The dissenters argued that the job offer did not
achieve the make-whole objective of the Act.' 65 They objected to
the majority's holding as both unnecessary and unfair, and strongly
criticized the decision as authorizing employers to make "cheap of-
fers" to the victims of their past discrimination.166
In 1983, the Supreme Court addressed a conflict between a concil-
iation agreement, to which the employer and the EEOC were par-
ties, 16 7 and a seniority provision in a collective bargaining
160. Id. at 241.
"161. Id. at 228-29.
162. Id. at 229.
163. Id. Although Ford involved the avoidance of title VII liability prior to an adjudication
of illegal discrimination, the Court in Ford moved towards a reversal of the presumption in
previous cases of the necessity of back pay or seniority relief for victims of discrimination. See
Note, Diluting Relief Under Title VII: Ford Motor Company v. EEOC-Employment Offer Absent Retro-
active Seniority Effective in Tolling Back Pay, 32 CAmH. U.L. REv. 665, 688 (1983) (noting Court
interpreted title VII's remedial provisions to require discrimination victims to abandon sen-
iority rights when accepting positions originally denied them).
164. Id. at 243 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissenters felt that the majority opinion
was a "wide-ranging advisory ruling" that stretched far beyond the confines of the case. Id. at
241. The Court's rule, the dissent argued, gave employers who engaged in unlawful hiring
practices a unilateral device to cut off their back pay liability to the victims of their past dis-
crimination. Id. at 241-42.
165. Id. at 250.
166. Id. at 249-50. The dissent further stated that employers could now unilaterally ter-
minate their backpay liability by extending to their discrimination victims offers they could not
reasonably accept. Id.
167. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber Cork, Linoleum &
Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 759 (1983). The conciliation agreement was entered into be-
tween the Equal Employment Oportunity Commission (the EEOC) and the employer in 1973,
pursuant to § 706(b) of title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982). After a lengthy EEOC inves-
tigation, the Director determined that there was reasonable cause to believe that W.R. Grace
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agreement. 168 In W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, International Union of
United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers, 169 the Court ad-
dressed the enforceability of an arbitral award for back-pay damages
issued against petitioner under its collective bargaining agreement
for layoffs that were effected pursuant to the conciliation agree-
ment.1 70 The Court noted that the company had committed itself
voluntarily to two conflicting contractual obligations.' 7' The Court
concluded that this dilemma was of the company's own making, and
therefore, refused to absolve the company from liability under its
collective bargaining agreement. 172
The Court also considered the importance, as a matter of public
policy, of voluntary compliance with title VII. 173 The employer in
this case voluntarily undertook obligations pursuant to a bargaining
agreement and it was not a violation of public policy to hold the
employer to those obligations.' 74 The company could not free itself
from or alter these obligations by entering into a conciliation agree-
ment to which the bargaining agent was not a party. An employer,
the Court held, could not escape responsibility under one contract
by entering into another that contained conflicting terms. 75
& Co. had discriminated against women and blacks in violation of title VII. Id. at 759. The
Director also had found that the company's seniority systems unlawfully perpetuated the ef-
fects of past discrimination. Id.
168. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum &
Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757 (1983). The Supreme Court decided this cases under § 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982). The conflict the Court
faced was similar to the conflict it faced in Stotts the following year. See Firefighters Local
Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2581-82 (1984) (addressing conflict between con-
sent decree that conflicted with seniority provisions of collective bargaining agreement).
169. 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
170. Id. at 759. An arbitrator made the award in question, having before him the com-
pany's undisputed admission that it had violated the security provisions of its collective bar-
gaining agreement. Id. at 763. The arbitrator also accepted the company's position that they
acted in good faith in following the conciliation agreement. Id. He concluded, however, that
the contract did not contain a good faith exception and that the company breached the collec-
tive bargaining agreement at its own risk. Id. at 763-64. Thus, the conciliation agreement did
not "extinguish the Company's liability for its breach." Id. at 764. In an action by the com-
pany to overturn the arbitrator's award, the district court found that "public policy prevented
enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement." Id. The court of appeals reversed, ap-
plying a standard of review that deferred to the arbitrator's decision unless it detracted from
the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 764. The Supreme Court affirmed
this decision. Id. at 772.
171. Id. at 767.
172. Id. The Court recognized that the company needed to reduce its work force, how-
ever, the Court refused to allow economic necessity as a defense to the company's breach of
the bargaining agreement. The Court stated that the company could not avoid liability under
voluntarily assumed contractual obligations merely because it would have suffered economic
loss by postponing or forgoing its layoff plans. Id. at 768 n.12.
173. Id. at 770.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 771. The Court stated that permitting the company to alter the collective bar-
gaining agreement without the union's consent would undermine the federal labor policy in
favor of enforcing collective bargaining agreements. Id. This policy, however, comes into
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The Supreme Court in Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts,1 76
continued its very limited reading of title VII. The decision effec-
tively negated black firemen's rights to employment acquired under
a consent decree that conflicted with seniority provisions under a
collective bargaining agreement.' 77 In Stotts the Court circum-
scribed the reach of title VII. In contrast with its decision in Grace,
the Court denied relief under the consent decree and treated sen-
iority rights with great deference in derogation of minorities' em-
ployment rights. 178
III. THE DECISION IN FIREFIGHTERS LOCAL UNION
No. 1784 v. SToTTs
With the Supreme Court's decision in Stotts, the conflict between
seniority and title VII reached a climax. Justice Blackmun, in his
dissent, noted that the majority's opinion in Stotts "is troubling less
for the law it created than for the law it ignored."' 179 The following
section of this Article will analyze the decision in Stotts. First, it will
set forth the facts of the case. Then, it will analyze the lower court
opinions followed by the Supreme Court's majority and dissenting
opinions. Finally, it will critically evaluate the decision in Stotts.
A. The Facts of Stotts
In 1974, the United States Department of Justice instituted an ac-
tion against the city of Memphis alleging that the Memphis Fire De-
partment and other city divisions engaged in a pattern or practice of
discrimination based on race and sex in the city's hiring and promo-
tion policies.' 80 To settle the dispute, the parties entered into a
consent decree.' 8 Pursuant to that decree, the city of Memphis
agreed to increase black and female representation in the city's
workforce to approximate the percentage in the Memphis
workforce.18 2 The city, however, made slow progress towards meet-
conflict with the policy in favor of voluntary compliance with the antidiscrimination laws
where collective bargaining agreements conflict with such voluntary measures.
176. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
177. Id. at 2590.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 2595 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
180. Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 541, 546-47 (6th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nora.
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
181. Consent Decree, United States v. City of Memphis, No. C-74-286, reprinted in Stotts v.
Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 541, 570-73 app. (6th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub noa. Firefighters
Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984) hereinafter cited as 1974 Consent
Decree.
182. Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 541, 547 (6th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub non.
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984). The 1974 decree's pur-
pose was twofold. First, it sought to ensure that in the future the city would not place blacks
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ing its goal. Seven years after entry of the decree, less than twelve
percent of uniformed fire department employees as compared to
thirty-five percent of the Memphis workforce were black. The great
majority of blacks the city had hired by 1981 remained in entry level
positions. White workers occupied almost exclusively the higher-
level positions.18 3
In 1977, Carl Stotts, a black captain in the city's fire department,
filed a class action suit against the city of Memphis in federal district
court, alleging that the fire department had denied him a promotion
based on his race.184 After extensive discovery, the parties entered
into another consent decree. The decree incorporated the long-
term hiring goals that the earlier decree set forth and enumerated
specific hiring and promotion quotas. 185 . The decree also gave the
district court jurisdiction to issue further orders to effectuate the
purposes of the decree.18 6
On May 4, 1981, the city announced that budget deficits would re-
quire the layoff of nonessential personnel from all departments.18 7
The layoffs were to be conducted on a last-hired, first-fired basis.1 88
Although neither decree directly addressed the question of layoffs,
the 1974 decree provided that for "promotion, transfer and assign-
ment," the seniority of a member of the protected class was that
person's total seniority with the city.1 89 The city demoted fourteen
of eighteen blacks promoted under the 1980 decree and laid off fif-
teen of eighteen blacks hired under that decree. 190
and women at a disadvantage in its hiring, promotion, and transfer policies. Second, it sought
to remedy the disadvantage that blacks and women suffered from past discrimination so that
they could enjoy equal employment opportunities. Id. at 571.
183. Brief for Respondents on Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit at 3-4, Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1982), rev'd
sub nom. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
184. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2581 (1984). In 1979,
another black firefighter filed an action alleging that the city had denied him a promotion
because of his race. Id. The district court consolidated the cases. Id.
185. Consent Decree, Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, No. C-79-2441-M, reprintedin Stotts v.
Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 541, 573-79 app. (6th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Firefighters
Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984) hereinafter cited as 1980 Consent
Decree. The decree required that the city annually fill at least 50% of all vacancies with quali-
fied black applicants, insure that at least 20% of firefighters promoted into each position
would be black, and promote certain named plaintiffs. Id.
186. Id. at 578.
187. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2581 (1984).
188. Id.
189. 1974 Consent Decree, supra note 181, at 572 app. Because the stated purpose of the
1980 decree was not only to remedy the city's past hiring practices, but also to continue the
hiring and promotion efforts made under the 1974 consent decree, it is possible to argue that
the 1980 decree incorporated by reference the seniority provision of the 1974 decree. This
argument is buttressed by the fact that the 1980 decree incorporated the 1974 decree's long
term hiring goals. 1980 Consent Decree, supra note 185, at 576 app.
190. Brief for Respondents on Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
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B. The Lower Courts' Decisions
1. The district court
The plaintiffs in Stotts applied for a temporary restraining order in
the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennes-
see to enjoin the city from disproportionately laying off and de-
moting black fire department personnel protected by the decree.19'
The district court entered the requested order; plaintiffs then
moved for a preliminary injunction against the layoffs and demo-
tions. After a hearing, the district court entered an order enjoining
the city from "applying the seniority policy proposed insofar as it
will decrease the percentage of blacks in certain enumerated posi-
tions."' 192 Both parties appealed the district court's order. 93
2. The court of appeals
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision.' 94 The Sixth Circuit's review was lim-
ited to determining whether the district court erred in modifying the
1980 decree to prevent minority employees from being affected dis-
proportionately by unanticipated layoffs. 195 The court of appeals
concluded that the modified decree was fair and reasonable, the re-
sult of good faith, arm's-length negotiations. 96 The court, more-
over, deemed the affirmative action provisions to be reasonably
related to the remedial purpose of correcting the racial imbalance in
for the Sixth Circuit at 8-9, Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1982), rev'd
sub nom. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
191. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104. S. Ct. 2576, 2582 (1984).
192. Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 541, 551 (6th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom.
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984). One month later, the
district court expanded its order to include three additional positions. Id. The court gave
three reasons for its order. First, the layoffs and demotions constituted a change in circum-
stances. Second, the purpose of the 1980 decree was to correct the city's past hiring and
promotion practices. Third, "the proposed layoffs, would have a devastating and retrogres-
sive effect on minority employment and the affirmative action accomplished pursuant to the
consent decrees." Id. at 549. Thus, the court "ruled that the layoff policy would have a dis-
criminatory impact and the seniority system was not bona fide." Id. at 550-51.
193. Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 541, 551 (6th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nor.
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
194. Id. at 541. The court of appeals noted, however, that the district court had erred in
concluding that the city's seniority system was not bona fide. Id. at 551 n.6. The court of
appeals followed the standard that the Supreme Court articulated in International Bhd. of
Teamster v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), which required a finding of discriminatory
intent. See supra notes 100-10 and accompanying text (discussing standard in Teamsters).
195. Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 541, 551 (6th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom.
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
196. Id. The court considered the plaintiffs' statistical evidence of the city's discrimina-
tion patterns and concluded it was sufficient to create a strong prima facie case. Id. at 555-56.
The court also noted that the decree adequately recognized the interests of nonminorities
because it required that the city fill only 20%o of its promotions with minorities. Id. This is the
standard accepted in Weber. See supra notes 124, 132 (discussing Weber).
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the city's workforce,197 noting that consent decrees are favored
means of resolution of title VII suits. 198 The court also found that
the goal of achieving racial diversity was a reasonable and constitu-
tionally legitimate interest for the city to pursue. 199
Next, the court determined that the district court acted properly
in modifying the decree. 200 The court noted that a trial court re-
tains continuing jurisdiction to modify a decree if its operation be-
comes unreasonable,20 ' when the actions of one party threaten to
frustrate the decree's purpose. Thus the trial court has a duty to
ensure that the parties carry out the terms of the decree. 20 2 The
court concluded that if the city conducted the proposed layoffs ac-
cording to its existing seniority system, it would breach its duty
under the consent decree to engage in affirmative action in hiring
and promotion decisions.203 The court refused to allow an eco-
nomic hardship defense to the city's contract breach,20 4 but found
that the modification allowed the city to proceed with its proposed
layoffs without unreasonably violating its obligation under the
decree.205
The court cited three theories in support of the proposition that a
consent decree can alter the seniority provisions of a collective bar-
gaining agreement over the objections of an adversely affected
union. First, it recognized title VII's strong policy favoring volun-
tary settlement. 206 Second, the court acknowledged that the con-
sent decree did not decrease the power of the court to order relief
under title VII.207 The court also argued that an employer could
override, temporarily, the provisions of a collective bargaining
agreement pursuant to a valid affirmative action plan.20 8
C. The Supreme Court
1. The majority opinion
In its review of the district court's preliminary injunction, the
Supreme Court majority20 9 framed the issue as being whether the
197. Id. at 553.
198. Id. at 555.
199. Id. at 552-53.
200. Id. at 564.
201. Id. at 556.
202. Id. at 557.
203. Id. at 561.
204. Id. at 561-62.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 565.
207. Id. at 566.
208. Id. at 566-67.
209. Justice White delivered the opinion for the majority. Firefighters Local Union No.
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court exceeded its powers in ordering the city to lay off white em-
ployees when the otherwise applicable seniority system would have
called for the layoff of black employees with less seniority.210 The
Court concluded that the appellate court had erred in affirming the
district court's order.2 1' The Court, moreover, found that the dis-
trict court's injunction did not enforce the express terms of the con-
sent decree.2 12 Stating that consent decrees must be read within
their four corners and that the decrees in question did not expressly
mention layoffs, the Court ruled that the district court's order fell
outside the scope of the parties' agreement. 213 The Court also de-
cided that the layoffs caused by the unexpected economic crisis did
not constitute a change of circumstances that would justify a modifi-
cation of the consent decree, even where the layoffs threatened to
frustrate the decree's purpose.214
1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2581-90 (1984). Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion,
id. at 2590-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring), as did Justice Stevens. Id. at 2594-95 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority's conclusion that § 703(h) protected
the seniority system because the trial court found no discriminatory animus. Id. at 2592
(O'Connor, J., concurring). In addition, she argued that a court cannot grant preferential
treatment to any group. A court may use its remedial powers under title VII, she asserted,
only to prevent future violations and to compensate actual victims of discrimination. Id. at
2593. The respondents chose not to allege specific instances of discrimination, therefore,
Justice O'Connor concluded, the Court correctly held under the standard of review for pre-
liminary injunctions that respondents could not have prevailed if the case had gone to trial.
Id.
In his concurrence, Justice Stevens argued that the case involved only the administration of
a consent decree, and did not involve any issue under title VII. Id. at 2594 (Stevens, J., con-
curring). Justice Stevens believed there were two ways in which it was possible to justify the
injunction. First, the injunction could be justified as a reasoned construction of the consent
decree. Id. at 2595. The district court, however, never stated that it was construing the de-
cree, nor did it rely on any particular portion of the decree. Id.
The other possible theory to justify the injunction was as a modification of the decree,
which would be appropriate if the circumstances had changed. Id. Justice Stevens identified
the adverse impact that the proposed layoffs would have on blacks as the only changed cir-
cumstance. Id. He, however, did not consider this impact a change of circumstance that
would justify a modification of the decree. Id.
210. Id. at 2576.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 2585-86. The Court argued that the terms of the 1980 decree suggested that
the parties did not intend to depart from the existing seniority system because the decree
contained no express provision to that effect. Id. at 2586. In fact, the decree stated that it was
not "intended to conflict with any provisions' of the 1974 decree," which expressly antici-
pated that the city would recognize seniority. Id. at 2586. The only mention of seniority in
the 1974 decree, however, was in relation to promotion, transfer, and assignment, and not in
the context of layoffs. 1974 Consent Decree, supra note 181, at 572 app.
214. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2586-87 (1984). The
court of appeals had held that the modification was appropriate because the layoffs were a
new and unforeseen change in circumstances which threatened to frustrate the purpose of the
decree. Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 541, 563 (6th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nora.
Firefighters Local No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984). These unanticipated economic
circumstances necessitated action that would prevent the imposition of an undue burden on
blacks, even if the solution conflicted with a bona fide seniority system. Id.
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In addition, the Court held that the provision in the consent de-
cree permitting the district court to enter any order it deemed nec-
essary to effectuate the purpose of the decree did not apply to the
court's order in this case.215 The effect of the injunction, the Court
held, was to displace white employees with seniority over blacks.216
The Court viewed this remedy as improper under title VII's protec-
tion of bona fide seniority systems.21 7 Emphasizing section 703(h)'s
protection of bona fide seniority systems and relying on its decisions
in Teamsters and Franks, the Court reiterated that a system is bona
fide unless implemented with an intention to discriminate.2 18 The
Court found that there was no showing of discriminatory intent and,
therefore, that the seniority system was bona fide and the layoffs
pursuant to it were proper.21 9
2. The dissent
The dissenters, in an opinion thatJustice Blackmun authored and
Justices Marshall and Brennan joined,220 criticized the majority's
failure to recognize that the Court's sole task at hand was to review
the issuance of a preliminary injunction.221 Instead, the majority
looked at the district court's order as a permanent injunction, a rem-
edy never awarded in the lower court.222 Moreover, the dissenters
215. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2586 (1984). The de-
cree's purpose, the Court found, was to "remedy past hiring and promotion practices" of the
Fire Department. Id. The decree went on to provide a remedy,.the Court found, that did not
include the displacement of white employees with seniority over blacks. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. The Court also recognized that the union was not a party to the consent decree
and that members' rights should not be encroached without their consent. Id. However, this
totally ignored the Court's unanimous decision during the previous term in W.R. Grace & Co.
v. Local 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 759
(1983). See supra notes 167-75 and accompanying text (discussing W.R. Grace).
218. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2587 (1984).
219. Id. at 2587-88. In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court rejected the theories
advanced by the court of appeals. First the Court rejected the "settlement theory," which
proposed that "the strong policy favoring voluntary settlement of title VII actions permitted
consent decrees that encroached on seniority systems." Id. Second, the Court disagreed with
the court of appeals' finding that the trial court had the power to order relief consistent with
the remedial purposes 6f title VII and that, therefore, the trial court had the authority to
override seniority provisions to effectuate the purpose of the 1980 Decree. Id. at 2588. The
Court argued that such relief is available only to actual victims of discrimination. Id. at 2588
(citing Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424
U.S. 747 (1976)).
220. Id. at 2596-2610 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun commenced his dis-
sent with a strong argument that the case before the court was moot. Id. at 2596. Because the
layoffs that led to the issuance of the injunction had ended, the injunction had no effect on
any action by the city. Thus, the Court could have vacated the judgment of the appellate
court in order to terminate the effects of the injunction, as was the Court's longstanding prac-
tice. Id. at 2596.
221. Id. at 2600.
222. Id. The dissent noted that the majority's actions went against unanimously decided
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argued, even if the district court had issued a permanent injunction,
the court of appeals presented adequate grounds for its issuance.223
The dissent also argued that the majority misstated the issue
before the Court.2 24 The lower court did not require the employer
to lay off whites. If, however, the employer chose to lay off whites,
Justice Blackmun argued, it created a dilemma of its own making by
committing itself to two conflicting contractual obligations.22 5
The dissent, in addition, rejected the Court's conclusion that the
preliminary injunction was improper because it imposed on the par-
ties, as an adjunct of settlement, relief that the plaintiffs could not
have obtained at trial had they proven that a pattern or practice of
discrimination existed.226 Disagreeing with this proposition, the
dissent emphasized that courts possess the power to order race-con-
scious affirmative relief under section 706(g) of title VII.227 In sup-
port of this position, the dissent noted that courts of appeals
unanimously agree that such relief is appropriate, 22 because the
purpose of title VII is not only to make whole any particular individ-
ual, but also to remedy the present class-wide effects of past discrim-
ination or to prevent similar discrimination in the future.2 29
Justice Blackmun charged that the majority's reliance on the deci-
sions in Teamsters and Franks to require proof of actual discrimina-
tion was misplaced.230 First, the preliminary injunction did not
precedent. See id. at 2600-02 (discussing University of Texas v. Camenish, 451 U.S. 390
(1981)).
223. Id. at 2603-10. For a discussion of the court of appeals' rationale, see supra notes
194-208 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 210 and accompanying text for the majority's framing of the issue.
225. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2602 (1984) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber,
Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 767 (1983)).
226. Id. at 2605.
227. Id. at 2606. Section 706(g) of title VII provides, in part, as follows:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally
engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court
may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice,
and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include but is
not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay (paya-
ble by the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be,
responsible for the unlawful employment practice), or any other equitable relief as
the court deems appropriate.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
The majority argued that the legislative history of the Act indicated that this section did not
authorize race-conscious remedies. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct.
2576, 2589-90 (1984). The dissent rebutted the majority's interpretation of the legislative
history of the section and argued that indeed the section allowed class wide affirmative relief.
Id. at 2608-10 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 2606 (1984).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 2607 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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award individuals competitive seniority.231 Second, had the cases
gone to trial, the court could have awarded competitive seniority to
the plaintiffs had they proven that they were actual victims of dis-
criminatory practices in accordance with the procedures established
in Teamsters and Franks.23 2 At a more general level, the Court major-
ity's reliance on Teamsters was in error because that case addressed
only individual relief, not class-wide, race-conscious relief as in
Stotts. 233
D. The Continuing Controversy in Stotts
The following critique of the Supreme Court's decision in Stotts is
in two parts. The first part analyzes the legal problems with the de-
cision, both procedural and substantive;234 the second part dis-
cusses the practical problems.
1. Legal problems
The majority in Stotts committed a major procedural blunder
when it decided the validity of a preliminary injunction as if it were a
permanent injunction. 235 This procedural error caused the Court to
decide the case on the merits without having before it an adequately
231. Id. at 2606.
232. Id. at 2607. Justice Blackmun pointed out that, under the procedure established in
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 371, 375 (1977) and Franks v. Bowman Transp.
Co., 424 U.S. 747, 762-70 (1976), the plaintiffs first would have established at trial whether
the city had engaged in unlawful discrimination. In the second stage, the plaintiffs would have
established whether they were victims of discrimination. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v.
Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2607 (1984).
233. Id. at 2608.
234. The initial legal problem with the Court's decision in Stotts was the majority's ruling
that the case was not moot. Id. at 2583. The ruling deviated from the Court's previously
established standards for judging mootness. See supra note 220 (discussing dissent's criticism
of majority's ruling on mootness). The case presented no live case or controversy because the
facts underlying the consent decree no longer existed. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v.
Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2596 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Once the court of appeals
forbade layoffs that would disproportionately affect blacks, the city chose to conduct the lay-
offs pursuant to a modified plan under which the city laid off more senior whites before less
senior blacks. Id. The layoffs, however, ended and the city recalled all the laid off employees.
Id. Any injury that outlived the recall, including the loss of seniority and pay, could not be
resolved either pursuant to the injunction or pursuant to the decree which was the basis for
issuance of the injunction. If any controversy existed, it was independent of and separate
from the one before the Court. The dissent characterized the injunction as no longer affect-
ing the city so that a "ruling in this situation thus became wholly advisory." Id.
The Court's ruling on mootness in Stotts constituted serious juggling of established legal
standards. The only purpose served by these acrobatics was to grant the Court an opportu-
nity to narrow relief available under the Act, which the Court achieved by limiting the useful-
ness of consent decrees. Although such overreaching follows the Court's trend to limit title
VII relief, it is not to be condoned.
235. Fire Fighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2600 (1984) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting) (discussing Court's failure to address validity of preliminary injunction
under appropriate "abuse of discretion" standard).
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developed record. 23 6 The problem was exacerbated by the fact that
the district court issued the preliminary injunction pursuant to a
consent decree. By necessity and definition, the record in a case
that the parties resolved by consent lacked any findings or admis-
sions with respect to any legal violations, and was not as developed
as the record of a case litigated on the merits. 23 7
The Court's reliance on an incomplete, embryonic record penal-
ized the plaintiffs for not having litigated the case on the merits.
The proof that the Court required as a prerequisite for affirmative
relief-actual victim status or intent to discriminate 23 8-could have
been adduced if the case had gone to trial. Instead, the Court opted
to examine the merits as if it had before it all available evidence. 23 9
In so doing, the Court neglected its true task: the review of a prelim-
inary injunction. 240 As a result, the Court applied an erroneous
legal standard to the detriment of the original plaintiffs, who were
scrutinized in a context for which they had not prepared.
The first substantive weakness in the Court's decision is that the
decision does not fit the facts of the case. The Supreme Court
framed the question before it as whether the district court had im-
properly entered an injunction that required white employees to be
laid off, when the otherwise applicable seniority system would have
called for the layoff of black employees with less seniority. 24 1 There
are two major problems with this articulation of the issue: it not only
misstates the question before the Court, but it also misinterprets the
facts of the case.
The real question before the Court was the propriety of the dis-
trict court's issuance of a preliminary injunction. 242 The injunction
that the district court entered enjoined the defendants from apply-
ing the proposed seniority policy insofar as it would decrease the
percentage of blacks in certain specified positions. 243 The injunc-
tion merely prohibited the employer from altering a previous hiring
decision made pursuant to the consent decree with respect to a sub-
236. See id. at 2600 (concluding that Court addressed whether proposed layoffs violated
consent decree even though issue was not resolved in lower court).
237. See id. at 2596-97 (discussing perils of advisory opinions and concluding that issue in
instant case was moot).
238. See id. at 2587-88 (discussing requirements set forth in Teamsters protecting seniority
system absent proof of intention to discriminate and limiting redress to actual victims of ille-
gal discrimination).
239. See id. at 2600-01 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing impropriety of Court's treat-
ment of merits of underlying legal claim instead of preliminary injunction).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 2585.
242. Id. at 2591 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
243. Id. at 2583.
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ject matter within the decree's purview.2 44 On its face, the injunc-
tion did not require the employer to take any employment action
with respect to any nonminority employees. 245 Finally, and most
importantly, the injunction on its face did not require the employer
to override seniority of existing employees.246 If, pursuant to the
injunction, the employer chose to lay off whites with more seniority
than blacks who were retained, layoffs of the nonminorities resulted
from the employer's actions, not the district court's mandate. 247
In addition, not only did the injunction not "require" that the em-
ployer lay off white employees, the black employees whom the em-
ployer would have laid off in lieu of the white employees did not
possess less seniority. The facts before the Court concerned the dis-
missal of three out of six employees, all of whom possessed equal
seniority. The record before the Court indicated that the employer
had hired the six employees, three white and three black, on pre-
cisely the same day.24 8 The city's practice, when equally senior em-
ployees with indistinguishable records were involved in layoffs was
to apply a reverse alphabetical order system for laying off person-
nel.249 Thus, the true differentiating factor among the six employ-
ees was the letter of the alphabet with which their last names
commenced. In Stotts, the blacks' names were more junior-alpha-
betically speaking-than the whites'. 250 Only by virtue of this
scheme did the employer decide that the blacks, instead of the
whites, should be dismissed. This indeed was a far cry from the
Stotts majority's characterization of the facts.
The next major substantive flaw in the majority's opinion was its
perception of a conflict between the injunction that the district court
issued pursuant to the consent decree and the seniority system set
up in the memorandum of understanding between the employer
244. See id. at 2602 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority was wrong in stating
that injunction required employer to lay off white workers).
245. Id..
246. Id. at 2606.
247. Id. at 2602. In response to the injunction the employer followed its seniority policy
in instituting the layoffs. That policy, however, was the employer's choice, not the result of a
court order. The court did not give the employer affirmative instructions on conducting lay-
offs; it merely informed the employer that it could not conduct layoffs in a fashion that would
decrease the percentage of blacks presently employed. Id.
248. Brief for Respondents on Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit at 81-83, Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1982), rev'd
sub nor. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
249. Id.
250. Id. at 82-83. Under the layoff policy, the city would have laid off the black workers
because their names began with the letters "J" and "M" and because their work records were
only as good as, but not better than, records of the white firemen, whose names began with
the letters "D" and "H" under this "simultaneously hired, reverse alphabetically fired" sys-
tem. Id.
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and the union.251 Arguably, there were no conflicting enforceable
legal documents that created the rights alleged because the memo-
randum of understanding, which established the seniority system,
was not legally enforceable pursuant to state law. 25 2 In any event,
any rights that would arise under the memorandum would be totally
separate, as a matter of legal existence, from the employees' rights
under the consent decree.
It is arguable that an enforceable seniority system might be found
in the employer's unilateral adoption of the seniority policy de-
scribed in the memorandum. However, in such a case, the existence
of enforceable rights would not be based on a document but rather
on the employer's adoption of the policy. These rights would be
individual contract rights arising between each employee and the
employer.25 3 Such rights, therefore, are totally separate, as a matter
of legal existence, from the employee's rights under the consent de-
cree. Each employee's recourse would be to file a breach of contract
claim against the employer.
Regardless of the source of the employees' seniority rights, there-
fore, they were existent and enforceable on a separate and in-
dependent basis from any rights that the consent decree created. If
indeed the employer found itself in the midst of conflicting contrac-
tual obligations, the conflict was the employer's own responsibil-
ity.254 As the Court stated in its decision in Grace, the city could
follow the consent decree as the district court ordered and risk lia-
bility under the memorandum of understanding, or it could follow
the memorandum of understanding and risk both a contempt cita-
tion and liability for violation of the consent decree. The city's di-
lemma, however, was of its own making because the city had
committed itself to two conflicting contractual obligations. 255
Under this contracts analysis, the Court's decision in Stotts is
flawed. Absent enforceable seniority rights, there could be no con-
flict between the consent decree and a nonexistent seniority policy.
In the event that enforceable seniority rights existed, the Court's
reasoning in Stotts fails under a Grace analysis because obligations
251. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2587 (1984).
252. Id. at 2599 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Fulenwider v. Firefighters Ass'n Lo-
cal Union 1784, 649 S.W.2d 268 (1982)) (holding that memorandum of understanding con-
ferred no enforceable rights). The majority chose to treat the memorandum as enforceable
because the court of appeals had assumed that it was valid. Id. at 2585 n.7.
253. Of course, in this situation, the right to enforce would belong to each individual, not
the Union. The employees might also have a reliance theory on which to base their claim.
254. Id. at 2602 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759,
Int'l Union of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757 (1983)).
255. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum
& Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 767 (1983).
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under a consent decree and obligations pursuant to a seniority pol-
icy are independent legal obligations.256 The performance of one
obligation does not excuse performance of the other. The employer
remains obligated under both agreements and, contrary to the
Court's decision in Stotts, should not be excused from performance
under either.257
The third substantive problem with Stotts is the Court's misappli-
cation of existing law. The majority relied on both case law and
statutory law to reach its decision.258 In both instances, the Court
erroneously applied the pertinent law. The Court's reliance on
Teamsters was misplaced. The decision in Teamsters dealt with indi-
vidual rights,259 whereas the Court in Stotts adjudicated the rights of
a class. 260 In addition, the Court's reliance on the standards set out
in Teamsters was unfounded because the lower court in Stotts did not
award retroactive seniority.261
The Court's attempt to justify its application of Teamsters as con-
sistent with section 7 06 (g) is equally poor. The Court asserted that
section 706(g) limits relief available under title VII.262 This simply
is not correct. Indeed, if anything, section 706(g) broadens avail-
able relief because it expressly authorizes courts to order any other
equitable relief that the court deems appropriate. 263 The only limi-
tation that section 7 06(g) places on the courts is that they may not
grant relief under the section if the employment action was for any
reason other than discrimination. 264 It is unfair and illogical to read
the section as permitting courts to grant equitable relief exclusively
in litigated situations and only to actual victims. 265 Such a reading
would eviscerate courts' broad remedial powers in anything but a
full-fledged trial. Moreover, such interpretation mocks the policies
of title VII specifically, and the judiciary in general, which favor vol-
256. See id. (describing conflict between conciliation agreement and collective bargaining
agreement resulting from company's voluntary legal commitments).
257. See id. (discussing employer's ability to follow conciliation agreement mandated by
district court and thereby risk liability under collective bargaining agreement).
258. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2587-89 (1983).
259. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 357 (1976).
260. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2608 (1983).
261. Id. The issue present in the instant case, the scope of classwide relief, was not pres-
ent in Teamsters because Teamsters concerned only the problems of determining victims and the
nature of appropriate individual relief. Id.
262. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2588-89 (1984).
263. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982). See supra note 227 for text of § 706(g).
264. Id.
265. See Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2608 (1984) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting) (arguing against majority's reading of § 706(g) as prohibiting race-con-
scious relief).
1986]
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:339
untary settlement of cases.2 66
At the time when the Supreme Court decided Stotts, the courts of
appeals unanimously viewed race-conscious affirmative relief as an
appropriate remedy in class actions under section 706(g).267 Fur-
thermore, lower courts have continued this trend after Stotts, award-
ing class-wide, race-conscious, affirmative action relief pursuant to
title VII.2 68 Such relief is essential to effective enforcement of title
VII rights. 269 The protected classes are groups that historically have
been victims of discrimination. It is not always the individual that is
the target of illicit practices, but rather it is the group to which he or
she belongs that subjects the individual to employment discrimina-
tion.270 As the dissent in Stotts emphasized, the purpose of class-
wide, race-conscious relief is not to make whole any particular indi-
vidual, but rather to remedy the present, class-wide effects of past
discrimination or to prevent similar discrimination in the future.27'
2. Practical problems
The practical lesson that the Supreme Court's decision in Stotts
teaches to potential title VII plaintiffs is that voluntary settlement is
no longer a dependable resolution of a title VII claim. The chief
purpose of consent decrees in discrimination cases is to avoid the
time and expense of litigating the issue of liability and identifying
the victims of discrimination. 272 Settlement without a resolution on
the merits, however, may lock in a record that does not demonstrate
discriminatory intent or identify actual victims. 273 In his dissent,
Justice Blackmun observed that the majority in Stotts focused on
what the minority employees actually established in the existing rec-
ord rather than what they might have established at trial.2 74 Pre-
sumably, therefore, the majority decision in Stotts would support a
266. Id. at 2607-08 (quoting Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 88 n.14
(1981)).
267. See id. at 2606 n.10 (citing cases in which courts of appeals held race-conscious relief
appropriate).
268. See infra note 281 and accompanying text (citing decisions by lower courts that have
not strictly adhered to Stotts precedent).
269. See Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2806 (1983) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting) (discussing purposes of class-wide, race-conscious relief).
270. See Cooper & Sobol, supra note 6, at 1602-04 (describing- impact of seniority on
blacks in previously racially segregated units).
271. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2606 (1984) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
272. Id. at 2607.
273. See id. at 2588 (discussing failure to show that any blacks protected from layoffs were
actual victims of discrimination or were awarded competitive seniority). In his dissent,Justice
Blackmun characterized the court's focus as unfair because it criticized respondent for failing
to show claims that never went to trial. Id. at 2607 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
274. Id.
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court's decision on the merits in a dispute concerning a title VII
consent decree based on a settlement oriented record. Based on the
decision in Stotts, litigants would be well-advised to avoid settlement
to assure the fullest possible record for review. Litigation would be-
come practically unavoidable as the uncertainty of later court treat-
ment of the record would outweigh the advantages of voluntary
settlement. 275
For potential title VII defendants, the opinion in Stotts also dis-
courages settlement. The advantage that defendants derive from
settlement is that the public does not scrutinize the defendant's past
discriminatory practices in the context of the courtroom. In addi-
tion, defendants may be able to arrange a settlement more to their
liking than a court imposed affirmative action plan. It is a great dis-
incentive to settlement if, as a precondition, a defendant must con-
cede liability. 276 The burden that the majority in Stotts imposes
hurts both sides.
Parties rely on the judicial system to provide equitable resolution
of disputes, especially when each side feels justified in its position.
Justice Brennan has recognized that "a case settled is a case best
disposed of, because then one of the parties certainly avoids the
heartache of losing at the trial" 277 Loss of the prospect of dependa-
ble voluntary settlement deprives the parties of an important oppor-
tunity to use the system to their mutual advantage.
The majority's decision in Stotts will impose costs on plaintiffs, de-
fendants, and the public. Plaintiffs will need vast resources to pur-
sue title VII relief. If plaintiffs can afford to file, defendants can
expect both legal expenses and loss of goodwill. Discovery will be
complicated and expensive. Society will pay the cost of litigation
that could have reached settlement. More importantly, society also
will pay the cost of continuing discrimination. When plaintiffs can-
not afford to litigate and when defendants are afraid to initiate set-
tlement, the elimination of illegal discrimination is frustrated.
It may be impossible to ascertain the extent to which the decision
in Stotts actually increases the cost of title VII litigation. The pros-
pect of added expense, however, is a step backward in the elimina-
tion of employment discrimination. 278 Consent decrees retain the
275. See id. (discussing preference for voluntary settlement of employment discrimination
claims).
276. Id.
277. Colliers & Levin, Containing the Cost of Litigation, 37 RUTGERS L. REv. 219, 239 n.70
(1985) (quoting DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ATrORNEY GENERAL'S CONFER-
ENCE ON COURT CONGESTION AND DELAY IN LITIGATION 87 (1956)) (citations omitted).
278. As Justice Brennan stated, "the cost of litigation is excessive if the same quality of
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advantages of speed and economy as compared to protracted litiga-
tion. The Supreme Court in Stotts discounted the quality of volun-
tary dispute resolution, leaving full scale litigation the only reliable
method for obtaining title VII relief.
IV. THE CONTINUING DILEMMA: TITLE VII V. SENIORITY
Many questions remain open after the Supreme Court's decision
in Stotts with respect to the interplay between seniority rights and
title VII rights. 279 The following section of this article analyzes the
cases decided after Stotts, giving special attention to Wygant v. Jacson
Board of Education.280 The section then scrutinizes the decision mak-
ing of individual Supreme Court justices in this area.
A. The Aftermath of the Decision in Stotts
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decision in Stotts, lower
courts have continued to hold that courts may award race-conscious
affirmative action relief pursuant to title VII.28 l Recently, in sup-
dispute resolution could be provided to litigants in a more efficient manner-at less expense
and with less delay." Id. at 238.
279. Numerous lower federal courts already have cited the decision in Stotts. See, e.g., Dev-
ereaux v. Geary, 765 F.2d 268, 269 (5th Cir. 1985) (construing Stotls as not invalidating con-
sent decree); Turner v. Orr, 759 F.2d 817, 820-21 (11 th Cir. 1985) (applying Stotts analysis of
consent decree); United States v. Western Elec. Co., Inc., 592 F. Supp. 846, 859 n.41 (D.D.C.
1984) (noting Stotts Court's clear implication to look at parties' intent in analyzing consent
decree). Several lower courts have cited Stotts for its procedural holding, even in cases unre-
lated to title VII. Most of these cases cite Stotts for the proposition that courts must ascertain
the scope of a consent decree from its four corners. Turner v. Orr, 759 F.2d 817, 821 (11 th
Cir. 1985); H.F. Allen Orchards v. United States, 749 F.2d 1571, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 64 (1985); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorusch, 744 F.2d 963, 971 (3d Cir.
1984) (environmental law); Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 742 F.2d 1007,
1011 (7th Cir. 1984); Uzzell v. Friday, 592 F. Supp. 1502, 1520 (M.D.N.C. 1984); United
States v. Western Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 846, 858 n.41 (D.D.C. 1984) (antitrust). One case
discussed and distinguished the ruling in Stotts on mootness. Boston Chapter, NAACP v.
Beecher, 749 F.2d 102, 104 (Ist Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2154 (1985). Other cases
citing Stotts have addressed the limits of title VII relief, including distinguishing between court
ordered and voluntary relief and in analyzing the Court's "actual victim" language. See infra
notes 285-86 (citing cases distinguishing Stotts).
280. 746 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985), rev'd, 54 U.S.L.W. 4479
(1986).
281. See EEOC v. Local 638, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 753 F.2d 1172, 1185 (2d
Cir. 1985) (rejecting contention that Court in Stolls eliminated all race-conscious relief except
that benefiting specifically identified victims of past discrimination), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 58
(1985); Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479, 487-88 (6th Cir.) (reading
Stotts in light of Weber and concluding that Weber precludes any notion title VII forbids volun-
tary affirmative action by employer), cert. granted sub nom. Local 98, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters,
AFL-CIO C.L.C. v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 59 (1985). On February 25, 1986, the
Supreme Court heard back to back arguments on Local 638 and on Vanguards. In deciding
Local 638, the Supreme Court will answer whether title VII prohibits court ordered affirmative
action plans that establish numerical goals for minority membership in a union. The respon-
dent urged the Court that § 706(g) permits a court to order race-conscious relief to persons
who are not actual victims of discrimination. See 54 U.S.L.W. 3574 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1984) (pro-
viding summary of argument). In Vanguards, on the other hand, the petitioner-union urged
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port of race conscious relief, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit declared that "Title VII was designed to deter and
remedy discrimination on the basis of group characteristics and to
remove barriers that favor certain groups over others." 282 In gen-
eral, courts have concluded that section 706(g) does not limit the
remedies available to parties through consent decrees.283 They
have narrowly construed any attempts to limit relief available
through consent decrees and have emphasized that courts' concerns
should focus on whether the agreement furthers the purposes of ti-
tle VII.284
Lower courts' interpretation of title VII as not limiting the scope
of voluntary relief has narrowed the impact of Stotts. These courts
have concluded that Stotts did not address title VII limits on the
adoption of voluntary affirmative action plans. This construction re-
stricts Stotts' precedential value to cases of court-ordered relief.28 5
the Court to rule that title VII prohibits courts from approving consent decrees that contain
race-conscious affirmative action plans because § 706(g) expressly limits relief to actual vic-
tims of discrimination. See 54 U.S.L.W. 3574 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1986) (providing summary of argu-
ment). These cases, together with Wygant, see infra notes 294-98 and accompanying text
(discussing Wygant) will clarify the impact of Stotis on title VII affirmative relief. See also Diaz v.
AT&T, 752 F.2d 1356, 1360 n.5 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that Stotts does not undermine
group-rights goals of title VII); Van Aken v. Young, 750 F.2d 43, 45 (6th Cir. 1984) (support-
ing voluntary race-conscious affirmative relief); Wygant. v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 746 F.2d
1152, 1158 (6th Cir. 1984) (finding that Weber was controlling and stating that it was not over-
turned by Stotts), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985); Kromnick v. School Dist. of Philadelphia,
739 F.2d 894, 909 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting that courts of appeals have found unanimously that
title VII, like equal protection, does not forbid race-conscious remedial action), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 782 (1985); Hammon v. Barry, 606 F. Supp. 1082, 1094 (D.D.C. 1985) (holding
Stotts did not preclude use of any race-conscious affirmative action plan); Deveraux v. Geary,
596 F. Supp. 1481, 1486 (D. Mass. 1984) (noting Court in Stotts would have made its intention
clear if it had meant to require actual discrimination in any affirmative action case), affirmed,
765 F.2d 268 (1st Cir. 1985).
282. Diaz v. AT&T, 752 F.2d 1356, 1360 (9th Cir. 1985).
283. See Turner v. Orr, 759 F.2d 817, 824 (11 th Cir. 1985) (stating court has authority to
approve consent decree that provides remedies not provided by statute); Vanguards of Cleve-
land v. City of Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479, 487 (6th Cir.) (stating § 703(h) and 706(g) failed to
address actions employer may take voluntarily), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 59 (1985); Dougherty
v. Barry, 607 F. Supp. 1271, 1286 (D.D.C. 1985) (distinguishing Stotts as not dealing with
limits imposed under title VII on adoption of voluntary affirmative action).
284. See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(focusing on statute's purpose, not parties' interests, in assessing agreement), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 2668 (1984).
285. See Turner v. Orr, 759 F.2d 817, 824 (1 lth Cir. 1985) (distinguishing Stolts as involv-
ing court-ordered relief); Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479,489 (6th
Cir.) (stating Court in Stotts did not treat case as involving voluntary action), cert. granted, 106
S. Ct. 59 (1985); Van Aken v. Young, 750 F.2d 43, 45 (6th Cir. 1984) (distinguishing Stotts as
involving vested seniority rights); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 746 F.2d 1152, 1158 (6th
Cir. 1984) (reading Stotts as not barring voluntary affirmative action relief), cert. granted, 105 S.
Ct. 2015 (1985), rev'd on other grounds, 54 U.S.L.W. 4479 (1986); Kromnick v. School Dist., 739
F.2d 894, 911 (3d Cir. 1984) (distinguishing Stolts and noting that in the instant case school
district and union incorporated race-conscious affirmative relief in collective bargaining con-
tract), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 782 (1985); Dougherty v. Barry, 607 F. Supp. 1271, 1286 (D.D.C.
1985) (noting Court in Stotts did not address limits on voluntary programs under title VII,
3751986]
376 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:339
Courts also have interpreted narrowly the "actual victim" lan-
guage of the decision in Stotts. The Second Circuit expressly refused
to interpret Stotts as prohibiting all race-conscious relief except to
specifically identified victims of past discrimination.286 One court
commented that if the Supreme Court had intended to "rewrite"
the Act to limit affirmative action relief to actual victims of discrimi-
nation, it would have clearly stated its intention in its decision in
Stotts. 28 7
The Stotts majority also held that affirmative court relief was not
proper without proof of intent to discriminate. 28 8 Illustrating the
confusion as to the reach of Stotts, the Seventh Circuit recently va-
cated its affirmance of and granted a rehearing on a ruling in which
an Indiana district court refused to apply this requirement with re-
spect to a voluntary affirmative action plan.28 9 The district court
had distinguished Stotts by juxtaposing court ordered relief and vol-
untary affirmative action.290
The Court's decision in Stotts has not impeded federal courts' reli-
ance on Weber to conclude that title VII allows employers voluntarily
to agree to plans that provide for seniority overrides. 29 1 Courts
only limits on district court's power); Hammon v. Barry, 606 F. Supp. 1082, 1094 (distin-
guishing Stotts on grounds that Hammon court was dealing with voluntarily adopted plan).
286. EEOC v. Local 638, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 753 F.2d 1172, 1185 (2d Cir.),
cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 58 (1985); accord Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F.2d 1514, 1530 (11 th Cir.
1985) (upholding district court's order enforcing consent decrees without showing of actual
discrimination); Deveraux v. Geary, 596 F. Supp. 1481, 1486 (D. Mass. 1984) (rejecting inter-
pretation of Stotts as changing title VII law so as to make illegal all affirmative action programs
unless there exists an actual victim), aft'd, 765 F.2d 268 (1st Cir. 1985); see also Geier v. Alexan-
der, 593 F. Supp. 1263, 1265 (M.D. Tenn. 1984) (rejecting government's suggestion that
court apply actual victim language of Stotts to school desegregation cases in order to limit
remedial powers of the court to afford affirmative relief only to actual victims and basing
remedial order, instead, on finding that members of defined group suffered effect of specific
acts of discrimination).
287. Deveraux v. Geary, 596 F. Supp. 1481, 1486 (D. Mass. 1984), afd, 765 F.2d 268 (1st
Cir. 1985).
288. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2587 (1984).
289. Britton v. South Bend Community School Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1223, 1230 (N.D. Ind.
1984) (distinguishing Stotts as dealing with court-imposed affirmative action programs), aff'd,
775 F.2d 794 (7th Cir. 1985), reh'ggranted andjudgment vacated, 783 F.2d 106 (7th Cir. 1986);
see also Grann v. City of Madison, 738 F.2d 786, 795 n.5 (7th Cir. 1984) (limiting Stotts to cases
where no discrimination is proven), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 296 (1985); NAACP v. Detroit Po-
lice Officers Ass'n, 591 F. Supp. 1194, 1202-03 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (rejecting Stolts analysis in
constitutional litigation where there had been prior judicial determination regarding past in-
tentional discrimination). Cf. NAACP v. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n, 591 F. Supp. 1194,
1202-04 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (holding that Stotts was not controlling in issues that involve liabil-
ity under fourteenth amendment).
290. See Britton v. South Bend Community School Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1223, 1230-37
(N.D. Ind. 1984) (concluding that application of Stotts in court imposed affirmative action pro-
grams does not extend to voluntary affirmative action plan), aFd, 775 F.2d 794 (7th Cir.
1985), reh'g granted and judgment vacated, 783 F.2d 106 (7th Cir. 1986).
291. Hammon v. Barry, 606 F. Supp. 1082, 1095 (D.D.C. 1985) (reading JWeber to hold
Stotts did not forbid voluntary affirmative action to override seniority systems).
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have adjudicated even voluntary cqnsent judgments to be consistent
with title VII's goal of eradicating "historical racial inequities in em-
ployment." 292 Notwithstanding lower courts' rulings after Stotts,
much speculation remains as to whether the Supreme Court in-
tended to overrule Weber sub silentio.293 The Supreme Court did
not answer this question when it decided Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education.294
In Wygant, with no prior judicial determination of discrimination
by the employer, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit upheld an affirmative action plan that was incorporated into
a collective bargaining agreement.2 95 The agreement provided that,
in the event of teacher layoffs, those teachers with the least seniority
would lose their jobs first, except that the employer would never lay
off minority personnel in a percentage greater than the percentage
of minority personnel employed at the time of the layoff.2 9 6 The
Sixth Circuit ruled that the Court's decision in Stotts did not bar this
form of affirmative action.29 7 The Supreme Court decided that the
Constitution bars this affirmative action relief as applied in Wygant.
It is uncertain what effect, if any, the Wygant decision will have on
292. Turner v. Orr, 759 F.2d 817, 826 (11th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).
293. Turner v. Orr, 759 F.2d 817, 826 (11th Cir. 1985); Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of
Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479, 487-88 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 59 (1985); Wygant v.Jack-
son Bd. of Educ., 746 F.2d 1152, 1158 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 58 (1985);
Hammon v. Barry, 606 F. Supp. 1082, 1095 (D.D.C. 1985). But see Vanguards of Cleveland v.
City of Cleveland, 753 F.2d at 489-93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that Stotts was con-
trolling because based on facts before court, principles of court ordered relief should apply,
not principles of voluntary actions).
294. 746 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985). The Court, how-
ever, did not address the title VII claim because petitioners did not appeal its dismissal by the
district court. The district court and circuit court opinions did address the title VII questions.
Because the Supreme Court limited its review to constitutional issues, Wygant's effect on title
VII law remains unclear. Given the parallel development of constitutional and title VII
claims, the constitutional analysis could be applicable to a title VII case. See General Elec. Co.
v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136-37 (1976) (holding that employer disability benefits' exclusion of
pregnancy does not violate title VII or Equal Protection Clause); see also infra note 298 (dis-
cussing Wygant's possible effect on title VII law). See infra note 298 (stating Court's position
on affirmative action relief as presented in Wygant.
295. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 746 F.2d 1152, 1158 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. granted,
105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985), rev'd, 54 U.S.L.W. 4479 (1986). The court relied on United Steel-
workers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979) (concluding that title VII allows voluntary
affirmative action plans); Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 1154-55 (6th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981) (extending Weber to public sector). The court in
Wygant also relied on Young for the proposition that ajudicial determination of discrimination
is unnecessary for a state to take voluntary action. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 746 F.2d
1152, 1158 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985).
296. Id. at 1154. Because of improved economic conditions, only one teacher assignment
was involved at the time that the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit heard
argument on the case. Id.
297. Id. at 1157-58. The court distinguished Stotts as involving court-ordered relief in
reaching its decision. Id. The court also held that Stotts did not overrule Weber. Id.
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the relief that courts may provide under title VII.298
B. The Supreme Court Trend
Equal employment opportunity policy development was most ex-
pansive in the early 1970's. In 1971, the Court significantly ex-
tended the reach of title VII when it held that a showing of
discriminatory effect on a protected class sufficed to establish a vio-
lation of the Act.299 The Court furthered this liberal trend by al-
lowing back pay3 0 0 and retroactive seniority reliefV0' in order to
make whole victims of discrimination. The Court addressed the
conflict between affirmative relief and the seniority rights of nonmi-
nority employees and concluded that relief could not be denied on
the basis of possible adverse impact on nonminority employees.30 2
By 1977, the Court shifted away from its early active protection of
minority rights toward a zealous protection of nonminorities' rights,
focusing on their "vested" seniority rights.30 3 By reading section
703(h) without regard to the purposes of the Act, the Court gave
virtually blanket protection to collectively bargained seniority sys-
298. It is unpredictable to what extent the Wygant case will affect the state of title VII law.
The Supreme Court heard the case on a constitutional question. As phrased by the Depart-
ment ofJustice in its brief in Wygant, the constitutional question is "whether the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permits a public entity to grant certain public
employees preferential protection against layoffs solely on the basis of their race or national
origin, when there is neither a finding nor even evidence that these (or any) employees have
been discriminated against by that entity." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1,
Wygant v.Jackson Bd. of Educ., 746 F.2d 1152, 1154 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct.
2015 (1985). With the possible exception ofJustice White, the justices in W'ygant agree that
affirmative action relief is constitutionally permitted. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 54
U.S.L.W. 4479, 4481 (1986) (White, J., concurring); id. at 4482-84 (Powell, J., plurality opin-
ion); id. at 4484-87 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 4489 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by
Brennan and Blackmun, JJ.); id. at 4492-93 (Stevens, J. dissenting). The Justices also agree
that actual findings of past discrimination are not a prerequisite for the adoption of such
relief. Id. at 4482 (Powell, J., plurality opinion); id. at 4485 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at
4490 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ.). A holding in Iygant
that affirmative action relief is unconstitutional would effectively have overruled Weber as Con-
gress could not, by legislation, allow unconstitutional relief. See United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979) (holding that title VII does not condemn all private, volun-
tary, race conscious affirmative action); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145 (1976)
(stating Congress made it unlawful for employer to discriminate on basis of sex and defining
concept of discrimination according to tradition). The Supreme Court's decisions in Local
638 and Vanguards, however, will address the title VII issue directly. See supra note 281 (dis-
cussing Supreme Court oral argument)
299. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
300. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 422 (1975).
301. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 748 (1976).
302. Id. at 775.
303. E.g., Ford Motor Co. V. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 239-40 (1982) (rejecting rule that
compels innocent workers to sacrifice seniority to persons claiming unlawful discrimination);
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979) (permitting affirmative action
plan that did not infringe on rights of white employees); Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 353-54 (1977) (concluding Congress did not intend to make it illegal for employees to
exercise vested seniority rights).
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tems against title VII charges. 30 4 The current trend also has cur-
tailed affirmative action relief. The Court now permits affirmative
action relief in only a few situations. 30 5 This Term, in Wygant, the
Court decided not to abolish this remedy completely as
unconstitutional.30 6
When examining the Supreme Court's resolution of the seniority-
title VII conflict, it proves instructive to scrutinize the individualJus-
tices' voting records. This conflict has included three major issues:
(1) the extent of section 703(h)'s protection of seniority systems; (2)
the viability of retroactive seniority relief under the Act; and (3) the
balancing of right to equal employment opportunity under title VII
and rights of seniority under collective bargaining agreements. The
voting records of the particular Justices divide the Court into two
groups: those who advocate the current trend towards a restrictive
reading of title VII and those who support title VII's policy goals of
equal employment opportunity.
The current majority advocates restricting the reach of title VII.
Chief Justice Burger, along with Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, and
White, consistently vote to extend section 703(h)'s protection of
seniority systems from claims of discrimination, 30 7 to limit retroac-
tive seniority relief,308 and to strike a balance in favor of seniority
rights. 30 9 They reject the advancement in employment of the pro-
tected classes if it is at the expense of a white incumbent.310
In attempting to mediate the seniority-title VII conflict, Justice
Powell has vacillated. He abstained in Albemarle,311 concurred and
304. See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 65-66 (1982) (evaluating
promotion system that separated white jobs from black jobs); United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979) (evaluating affirmative action plan granting blacks 50% of
openings in training program); United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 555 (1977) (evaluat-
ing collective bargaining agreement that reinstated employees without seniority credit for
prior services); Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 329-30 (1977) (challenging discrim-
inatory collective bargaining agreement).
305. Since its decision in Weber, the Court consistently has ruled to extend § 703(h)'s pro-
tection of collective bargaining agreements against title VII charges. See supra notes 135-44
and accompanying text (discussing Court's expanded reading of § 703(h)).
306. See supra note 298 and accompanying text (analyzing Wygant).
307. See, e.g., Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 (1982) (requiring actual intent
to discriminate before limiting § 703(h) protection of seniority system); American Tobacco
Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 75-77 (1982) (extending § 703(h)'s protection beyond holdings
in Teamsters and Evans).
308. See Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 241 (1982) (holding that offer of retroac-
tive seniority was not necessary to toll back pay liability).
309. See American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 78-79 (1982) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) (criticizing Court's extension of § 703(h) protection of nonminority rights which re-
sulted from past discrimination).
310. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 277 (1982) (stating that § 703(h) pro-
tects seniority system even if it perpetuates effects of pre-Act discrimination).
311. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 407 (1975).
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dissented in Franks,31 2 joined the majority in Teamsters to extend sec-
tion 703(h) protection of seniority systems, 31 3 and abstained in
Weber,314 where the Court supported affirmative action programs.
Since 1981, however, he has voted with the current Court's major-
ity.3 1 5 He believes that only benefit-type seniority, as compared
with competitive seniority, is appropriate relief under title VII. As
he stated in Franks, the rights of innocent employees should be the
controlling equitable consideration precluding competitive senior-
ity; minorities should not be granted preferential treatment.3 1 6
Justice Stevens promotes the extension of section 703(h)'s protec-
tion of seniority systems.31 7 He also tends to read the Act restric-
tively in deciding the extent of allowable relief.31 8 He cannot be
said to vote on "policy" or for nonminority rights as he votes on his
own view of the controlling law, which often results in his being a
swing vote.3 19
On the other hand, the current minority, comprised of Justices
Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall, advocates pursuing title VII's
policy goals of providing equal employment opportunities. Justices
Marshall and Brennan consistently have attempted to limit the pro-
tection of seniority systems under section 703(h).3 20 They have
urged that the Act should reach systems that lock in the effects of
past discrimination and have argued that the legislative history of
the Act does not support the interpretation that section 703(h) insu-
lates seniority systems that have a discriminatory impact.3 21 They
312. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 781 (1976).
313. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 328 (1977).
314. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 195 (1979).
315. See, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber, Cork, Lino-
leum & Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 758 (1983) (joining Justice Blackmun's unanimous
opinion); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 275 (1982) (joining White's majority
opinion); American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 64 (1982) (joining White's major-
ity opinion).
316. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 746, 786-93 (1976).
317. See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 88 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (describing affirmative defense for employer with bona fide seniority system that
appears to discriminate); United Air Lines Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 560 (1977) (stating that
§ 703(h) and labor policy preclude invalidation of facially neutral seniority system, regardless
of its discriminatory effects).
318. See American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 86-88 (1982) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (criticizing Court's 'strained' reading of statute).
319. See Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2594 (1984) (Ste-
vensJ., concurring) (concluding that administration of consent decree, not title VII, governs
disposition of instant case).
320. See American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 78-79 (1982) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) (criticizing Court's extension of § 703(h)'s scope of protection as inconsistent with
statute).
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has resolved the balance in favor of seniority rights, effectively im-
peding minorities' advancement in employment in contravention of
the purposes of the Act.3 3
7
Another factor that must be considered in the employment con-
text is labor market forces. The argument against disturbing the
existing status of employees is that the market principally deter-
mines employment opportunities and resulting distributive out-
comes.338 Economic forces in a market do not act independently of
the people who make the market function. People do not divorce
themselves from their personal ideologies when they make employ-
ment decisions. Thus, marketplace statistics merely reflect the views
of those who make the decisions.33 9 Title VII rendered illegal the
conscious or subconscious use of racist or sexist ideologies in mak-
ing employment decisions so that the protected classes would be
afforded equal employment opportunities.
Blacks and women, historically, have been excluded from equal
participation in the marketplace. Congress, in enacting title VII, in-
tended to remedy this historic exclusion. Congress recognized the
need to provide broad relief to the group that suffered historic
wrongs in order to eliminate existing practices and to correct the
impact of past practices.3 40 The Supreme Court in its decision in
Weber also recognized that the need to remedy past discrimination
was sufficient justification for accepting voluntary quotas when they
do not unnecessarily interfere with nonminority workers' rights.
3 41
If the Supreme Court in Wygant declares that this affirmative relief is
unconstitutional, it will effectively perpetuate the historical exclu-
sion of minorities from equal participation in the marketplace. Such
a result could not have been Congress' intent when it enacted title
VII.
Statistics on employment suggest that race and gender are still
criteria for discriminatory treatment in employment. Blacks and wo-
men are still underrepresented in the professional fields and over-
gained agreements, which are accepted by a majority of votes, adequately to protect their
interests.
337. See supra notes 303-05 and accompanying text (describing Court's shift towards pro-
tection of seniority rights at expense of minorities' equal employment opportunity rights).
338. Fallon & Weiler, supra note 9, at 15 n.64.
339. See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 1981 REPORT: JOB PATTERNS FOR
MINORITIES AND WOMEN IN PRIVATE INDUSTRY, I-I (1984) (Table 1) (showing that 81%0 of total
participants in labor market were white and 11.4%o were black).
340. See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text (discussing goals of title VII legislation).
341. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201-04 (1979) (discussing
propriety of race-conscious affirmative action plan voluntarily adopted to eliminate traditional
patterns of racial segregation).
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represented in blue collar and clerical jobs.3 42 Figures also indicate
that today, over twenty years after the passage of antidiscrimination
in employment laws, blacks still bear the burden of unemployment
in the labor market, with an unemployment rate consistently at least
twice that of whites.3 43
The marketplace, in theory, is a meritocracy. It is difficult, how-
ever, to accept that employment statistics reflect race or gender neu-
tral hiring. Rather, the statistics make a strong case for the
existence of discriminatory employment practices, which seniority
systems serve to perpetuate. The current Supreme Court majority's
view fails to consider these factors and further entrenches the ills
title VII sought to cure.
CONCLUSION
Racism and sexism exist today as unmeasurable social factors, as
an unpleasant social reality. However, they are illegalities based on
which no person's livelihood should depend; title VII mandates as
much. The conflict between civil rights and seniority rights repre-
sents a clash of two objectives: job security and equal employment
opportunity. In the employment game, innocent individuals are
forced into competition with one another. One ends up in the win-
ner's position and the other in the loser's position.3 44 The conflict
must be resolved fairly, yet one individual still must suffer a loss.
The question becomes one of loss allocation 45 and of legal force to
implement the allocation.
Title VII supplies the legal force in this socioeconomic context. It
requires the termination and also the correction of existing wrongs.
The law allocates the risk of loss to the nonminority group which,
through its prejudices, impeded the progress of the statutorily pro-
342. See supra note 338 (showing "Participation Rate" in labor market and "Occupational
Distribution").
343. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW 4
(1985). At the end of 1982, when whites were facing a 9.4%o unemployment rate, blacks were
facing a 20.5% unemployment rate. Id. At the end of 1983, the unemployment rates for
whites and blacks, respectively, were 7.3%o and 17.8%o; and at the end of 1984 the figures werc
6.2%o and 15.1%o, respectively. Id. After the second quarter of 1985, white unemployment
was 6.3%o and black unemployment was 15%o. Id.
344. Also, the persons competing for a position generally will not volunteer to take the
loss. L. THUROW, supra note 1, at 11.
345. Id. at 12. Some suggest that job-sharing is a good solution, but this is costly in terms
of rewards and resources. See supra note 331 (discussing alternatives to layoffs). Perhaps an
easy and too-obvious solution is for the employer to bear the burden. As in W.R. Grace & Co.
v. Local 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757
(1983), the employer must bear the burden of the dilemma he or she caused. This solution
may be futile and economically inefficient, however, if the employer does not have sufficient
economic resources available to satisfy employees' claims.
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tected minorities. Until the marketplace is freed of prejudice, those
who have, by their prejudices, created an unfair advantage for them-
selves must bear the burden of removing the constraints.
In order to effectuate the purposes of the Act, affirmative action
relief must be available to title VII claimants. The rightful place
doctrine is a step in the right direction that also serves to protect the
interests of the majority employees. Courts can supplement this
doctrine to include other compensation for discriminatory treat-
ment, exclusive of displacement of white male incumbents. For ex-
ample, applying the standard in Griggs to seniority systems that
perpetuate the effects of past discrimination accommodates both the
vested rights of the majority employees and the statutory rights of
the protected classes. In addition, voluntary self-regulation by em-
ployers for compliance with title VII, and in furtherance of its goals
via affirmative action plans, provides a means of promoting equal
employment opportunities. If those obligations conflict with ex-
isting collective bargaining agreements, Grace places on the em-
ployer the risk of loss, because it entered into conflicting contractual
obligations.
The current administration's position that an acceptable affirma-
tive action plan must be nondiscriminatory 46 is an intrinsically con-
tradictory concept. It makes a mockery of the principles of equality
title VII sought to promote. In a society divided by race and gen-
der, as is evidenced by minorities' positions in the labor force, it is
hypocritical and naive to ignore the continuing existence and effects
of discrimination. The protected classes must be allowed the op-
portunities that they have been denied throughout our nation's his-
tory. To require blindness to their handicap tortures the notion of
equality. The only way to eliminate this inbred disparity is to recog-
nize its immoral existence and take affirmative steps to eradicate it.
Until we are an unbiased society with respect to race and gender,
courts must have broad powers to correct employment conditions
that reflect racial or gender biases. This is the minority position in
the present Supreme Court, but it is the only stance that will effectu-
ate the letter as well as the spirit of title VII. In the words ofJustice
Thurgood Marshall: "In light of the sorry history of discrimination
and its devastating impact on the lives of Negroes [and women],
bringing the Negro [and women] into the mainstream of American
life should be a state interest of the highest order. To fail to do so is
346. Address of the Honorable Edwin Meese III, Attorney General of the United States to
Students and Faculty of Dickinson College 10 (Sept. 17, 1985).
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to ensure that America will forever remain a divided society."1
347
347. Regents of the University of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 396 (1978) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
